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DESTABILIZATION RIGHTS:
HOW PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION SUCCEEDS
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon*
"Public law litigation" - civil rights advocacy seeking to restructure public agencies has changed course over the last three decades. It has moved away from remedial
intervention modeled on command-and-control bureaucracy toward a kind of
intervention that can be called "experimentalist." Instead of top-down, fixed-rule
regimes, the experimentalist approach emphasizes ongoing stakeholder negotiation,
continuously revised performance measures, and transparency. Experimentalism is
evident in all the principal areas of public law intervention - schools, mental health
institutions, prisons, police, and public housing. This development has been substantially unanticipatedand unnoticed by both advocates and critics of public law litigation.
In this Article, we describe the emergence of the experimentalist model and argue that it
moots many common criticisms of public law litigation. We further suggest that it
implies answers to some prominent doctrinal issues, including the limits on judicial
discretion in enforcing public law rights and the constraints entailed by separation-ofpowers norms. Our interpretation understands public law cases as core instances of
"destabilization rights" - rights to disentrench an institution that has systematically
failed to meet its obligations and remained immune to traditionalforces of political
correction. It suggests reasons why judicial recognition and enforcement of such rights
might be both effective in inducing better compliance with legal obligations and
consistent with our structure of government.

I. INTRODUCTION

corned when not forgotten, yet transformed by its travails, public
law litigation is becoming -

again -

an influential and promising

instrument of democratic accountability.
In 1976 Abram Chayes argued that efforts to apply rule-of-law
principles to the institutions of the modern welfare state had produced
a new kind of litigation.' The "traditional" lawsuit involved two private parties and focused on allegations of a discrete past wrong implying a particular remedy, most often a one-time money payment from
the defendant to the plaintiff. Chayes showed that an important category of civil rights litigation departed radically from this model. These
* Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law and Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, respectively, Columbia University. We are grateful for various kinds of help to the Hewlett Foundation; to participants in workshops at Columbia, Pennsylvania, Stanford, and Yale; and to Jim Liebman,
Mike Dorf, Brad Karkkainen, Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke, Margo Schlanger, Michael Rebell,
Gillian Metzger, Judith Resnik, Mark Tushnet, Susan Sturm, John Boston, Jonathan Chasin, and
the practitioners cited in the notes who spoke to us about their work. Our largest debt is to Laura
Faer for insightful discussion and prodigious research assistance.
I See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV L. REV 1 81,
1284, 1288-89 (1976).
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"public law" cases involved amorphous, sprawling party structures; allegations broadly implicating the operations of large public institutions
such as school systems, prisons, mental health facilities, police departments, and public housing authorities; and remedies requiring longterm restructuring and monitoring of these institutions.
Chayes argued that the new litigation enriched the institutional
repertory of our democracy. In his view, the independence, flexibility,
and accessibility of the courts equipped them for the task of holding
chronically underperforming institutions accountable to governing legal standards. Public law courts were less susceptible to capture by
selfish interests and better able to induce fruitful discussion among the
relevant parties than the administrative agencies that might otherwise
have oversight responsibility.
Although Chayes's analytic description of public law litigation became canonical, his defense of it remained controversial. Early critics
doubted that courts had the necessary information to supervise institutional restructuring effectively. Even if the courts were sufficiently informed, these critics argued, their power seemed too narrow and too
shallow for the new task: Too narrow because the problems of public
agencies were linked to myriad other institutions and social practices,
while a court's power extended only to the parties before it. Too shallow because the operations of the agencies depended on the street-level
conduct of subordinates far below the court's view, while a court's direct remedial authority operated mainly against senior officials (and
even then, only with severe limitations).2
From the outset, the legitimacy of public law litigation was as suspect as its efficacy. For Chayes, such litigation would legitimate itself
by solving public problems that other institutions of the administrative
state could not. But many critics argued that even effective judicial
intervention of this kind was often illegitimate. They emphasized, as
Chayes had conceded, that these cases did not fit easily into traditional
notions of the judicial role or the separation of powers. They doubted
that conventional legal sources of authority and modes of analysis
could be made to speak in any direct or determinate fashion to the
task of devising remedies that restructured entire organizations. They
argued that the courts could not undertake the restructuring of administrative agencies without trenching on the authority of the executive
and legislative branches, and that federal courts could not superintend

2 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? ii (iggi); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV 43, 46 (1979); Donald L. Horowitz, De-

creeing OrganizationalChange:Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265.
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the restructuring of state and local agencies without compromising
3
principles of federalism and local autonomy.
The United States Supreme Court and other appellate tribunals
also expressed disapproval in a range of decisions designed to rein in
trial court discretion in public law actions. 4 Legislatures passed statutes - most notably, the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
(PLRA)5 - constraining the courts in these cases. Trial court judges
who undertook structural relief in some high-profile cases threw up
their hands in apparent exhaustion or despair, dissolving injunctions
purportedly because all practicable vindication of the plaintiffs' rights
6
had been achieved, even though little progress was detectable.
Even the liberal defense of Chayes's model took on an anxious
tone. 7 Proponents struggled uncomfortably with the jurisprudential
phenomenon of rights that did not come with ready-made remedies.
They worried about how to limit judicial discretion and preserve the
prestige of the courts. There was also increasing worry about the accountability of the advocates to their generally poor and ill-educated
clients - the putative right holders. 8
Yet despite decades of criticism and restrictive doctrines, the lower
courts continue to play a crucial role in a still-growing movement of
institutional reform in the core areas of public law practice Chayes
identified: schools, prisons, mental health, police, and housing. And
while they have opposed some judicial interventions, legislatures have
acquiesced in and even encouraged others. 9 There is no indication of a
3 See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, FederalCourts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV 949,
950-51 (1978); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV 661, 664 (1978); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot?
The Inherent Remedial Authority of the FederalCourts, 84 CAL. L. REV 1121 (1996).
4 See cases cited infra note ii; see also infra pp. 1082-87.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-34, iio Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at ii

U.S.C. § 523(a) (2ooo); at 18

U.S.C. §§ 3624(a), 3626 (2ooo); and in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
6 See, e.g., Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 326 (ist Cir. 1987) (dissolving the Boston school
desegregation decree); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS
115 (1993) (reporting that in the course of the Santa Clara County Jail case, "several judges [were]
•.. worn out by the litigation and withdrfew] from the case").
7 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 636 (1982); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 589, 674-79 (1983).
8 See ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 139-82 (2003).
9 Examples include the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of I98o, Pub. L. No. 96247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ I 9 9 7 -I 9 9 7 j (2000)), which authorizes the
Attorney General to bring suits to remedy "flagrant and egregious" conditions in prisons and mental health facilities; the 199o amendments to federal housing legislation that authorize the Department of Housing and Urban Development to seek judicial receiverships against persistently
"troubled" housing authorities, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j) (2000); state legislation in Texas and elsewhere responding to judicial findings of unconstitutional school conditions, see infra pp. 1026-2 7;
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reduction in the volume or importance of Chayesian judicial activity.
The particular forms of this activity, however, have evolved. The
remedies of recent years are different in important respects from those
that Chayes and his critics focused on.
The evolution of structural remedies in recent decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from command-and-control injunctive
regulation toward experimentalist intervention.
Command-andcontrol regulation is the stereotypical activity of bureaucracies. It
takes the form of comprehensive regimes of fixed and specific rules set
by a central authority. These rules prescribe the inputs and operating
procedures of the institutions they regulate.
By contrast, experimentalist regulation combines more flexible and
provisional norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability. In the most distinctive cases, the
governing norms are general standards that express the goals the parties are expected to achieve - that is, outputs rather than inputs.
Typically, the regime leaves the parties with a substantial range of
discretion as to how to achieve these goals. At the same time, it
specifies both standards and procedures for the measurement of the
institution's performance. Performance is measured both in relation to
parties' initial commitments and in relation to the performance of
comparable institutions.
This process of disciplined comparison is designed to facilitate
learning by directing attention to the practices of the most successful
peer institutions. Both declarations of goals and performance norms
are treated as provisional and subject to continuous revision with
stakeholder participation. In effect, the remedy institutionalizes a
process of ongoing learning and reconstruction. Experimentalist regulation is characteristic of the "networked" and "multilevel" governance
proliferating in the United States and the European Union - decisionmaking processes that are neither hierarchical nor closed and that
permit persons of different ranks, units, and even organizations to collaborate as circumstances demand.' 0
In cases that take the experimentalist approach, the courts are both
more and less involved in reconstituting public institutions than they
and state legislation in New Jersey and elsewhere responding to judicial findings of unconstitutional local land-use regulation, see infra pp. 1050--52.
10 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and
New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. I (2002).
In her study of private employment discrimination cases, Susan Sturm finds a shift in remedial practice from a top-down approach in "first generation" cases to an experimentalist one in
"second generation" cases that parallels the course we find in public law litigation. See Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural Approach, 1oi COLUM. L.

REV 458, 465-75

(2001).
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were when Chayes wrote. They are more involved because experimentalist remedies contemplate a permanent process of ramifying, participatory self-revision rather than a one-time readjustment to fixed
criteria. But the courts are less involved because the norms that define
compliance at any one moment are the work not of the judiciary, but
of the actors who live by them. At least in prospect, the demands on
the managerial capacities of the court, and the risk to its political legitimacy, are smaller in this continuous collaborative process than in
top-down reform under court direction.
To some extent, the experimentalist tendency has been responsive
to constraints imposed by the Supreme Court." Although key decisions of the Rehnquist Court sometimes seem unreflectively hostile to
public law litigation, they are plausible in their demand that lower
courts demonstrate stronger connections between the principles on
which their determinations of liability are based and the specific
means they impose as remedies. Yet beyond this general demand, the
Court's guidance has been ambiguous and incoherent. 12 The experimentalist practice of the lower courts has gone far beyond anything
suggested or anticipated in appellate doctrine.
In this Article, we offer an interpretation of the evolving approach
to public law intervention as a species of what we call "destabilization
rights. '13 Destabilization rights are claims to unsettle and open up
public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations
and that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability. The term focuses attention on a crucial common
element of the claims in the various areas of public law litigation and
on a dimension of the remedy that is critical to explaining the prospect
of successful intervention. The effect of the court's initial intervention
is to destabilize the parties' pre-litigation expectations through political, cognitive, and psychological effects that widen the possibilities of
experimentalist collaboration. The regimes of standards and monitoring that commonly emerge from remedial negotiation allow this destabilization, and the learning it generates, to continue within narrower
channels.

11See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (reversing a prison order as "inordinately
- indeed, wildly - intrusive"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (disapproving orders that
"enmeshed [lower courts] in the minutiae of prison operations"); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
832 (I977) (stating that there are multiple acceptable means of correcting a violation and of encouraging "local experimentation"); cf Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d i15, 1148 (sth Cir. 1982) ("Directing state officials to achieve specific results should suffice; how they will achieve those results
must be left to them unless and until it can be demonstrated judicial intervention is necessary.").
12 See infra section IV.A.
13 The term and the idea come from ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY:
ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530
(1987).
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In Part II we survey the major areas of public law litigation to illustrate the trend away from command-and-control approaches toward
experimentalist ones. In Part III we elaborate the idea of destabilization rights and argue, against Chayes, that it points to an important
continuity between public law litigation and traditional common law
adjudication. Part IV shows how the destabilization rights idea relates
to a series of issues that have preoccupied appellate doctrine, including
the relation between right and remedy, the separation of powers, respondeat superior, and the problem of interest representation. In each
case, we argue that the move to experimentalism suggests a resolution.
Ultimately, our claims for the promise of the new approach remain
as inconclusive as Chayes's. We end with the same cautious optimism
he expressed in 1976, based, like his, on casual observation. We do,
however, offer some ideas as to why the new approach might respond
to the concerns that have dominated legal scholarship since he wrote.
If our convictions are more firmly rooted than Chayes's, it is only because, in its recent development, public law has passed one critical test
of a truly vital idea: it has managed to generate responses to questions
that its proponents want to avoid and that its critics think unanswer14
able.
II. THE PROTEAN PERSISTENCE OF PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Here we survey the five principal areas of structural litigation over
public services - education, mental health:, prisons, police, and housing. In each we find indication of a growing and promising shift from
command-and-control to experimentalist intervention.
The command-and-control orientation has three characteristics:
First, an effort to anticipate and express all the key directives needed
to induce compliance in a single, comprehensive, and hard-to-change
decree. Second, assessment of compliance in terms of the defendant's
conformity to detailed prescriptions of conduct in the decree. These
prescriptions tend to be process norms that dictate conduct as a means
14 In his last work on international public law, Chayes described a trend in that field toward
arrangements of the sort we call experimentalist. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY

(995). The book argues that sovereignty in the international realm has
come to mean less the power to command from above and more the power to engage others in
discussion of what needs to be done. It describes numerous international regimes of collaborative
standard-setting, monitoring, and continuous revision based in part on comparisons with the experiences of others. Our project can thus be seen as revising Chayes's early efforts to understand
linked changes in the judiciary and the administrative state in light of his later intuition about a
more encompassing transformation of the character of democratic sovereignty. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Book Review, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, ro6 YALE L.J. 2599,
2638-39 (1997) (discussing the relation of Chayes's work on public law litigation to his work on
international law).
AGREEMENTS 25-26
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to the attainment of goals, rather than performance norms that directly mandate and measure goal achievement. And third, a strong directive role for the court or a special master in the formulation of the
remedial norms.
There has been a fairly clear and deliberate move away from the
first two characteristics. History with respect to the third - judicial
direction - is more ambiguous. Courts have encouraged negotiated
remedies from the beginning. But judges and special masters appear
15
to have been more directive in the past.
The change has not been strictly linear. Doubts about commandand-control appeared early, and some contemporary remedies continue
to have a command-and-control quality. But the general direction and
nature of the trend seems clear.

A. Schools 16
There have been three successive waves of public law litigation
concerning schools.' 7 The first consisted of federal desegregation suits.
The second involved challenges in the state courts to the equity of
school finance systems. The third continues efforts in the state courts
but shifts the normative focus from "equity" to "adequacy." The shift
from top-down, rule-based remedies to decentralized, standards-based
intervention is an important theme of this evolution.
The best-known body of public law litigation is the Herculean effort of the federal courts to desegregate the nation's public schools.
These efforts met with some early success in a few states, but massive
resistance stalled them in the South until Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Thereafter, especially between 1968 and 1972, the
federal courts oversaw the successful dismantling of segregation in
schools attended by millions of children through lawsuits brought by
private plaintiffs and by the federal government. Most of these
schools were in countywide districts in the rural South.' 8

15 See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355,
1365-76 (I99i). Surveying cases from the 197OS and early ig8os, Sturm identifies and illustrates
five judicial approaches to remedial formulation, four of which involve strong direction by the
judge or a special master. Sturm's discussion of the fifth approach, "consensual deliberation,"
presciently anticipates the developments we report here. See also Curtis J. Berger, Away from the
Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707, 7o8
(1978) (reporting the experience of a highly directive special master).
16 This section draws on James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003).
17 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave".
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV 1151, I153 (1995).
18 See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 94-105; Liebman & Sabel, supra note i6, at 195-201.
After two decades of stability, some of these gains have eroded in recent years. See generally Sean
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Outside the rural South, however, desegregation was impeded by
the combination of local school control and residential mobility. To establish liability, plaintiffs had to prove that school segregation resulted
from official conduct rather than from residential self-segregation by
individual choice. Issues of intention and causation were complex, the
standards were vague and inconsistent, and the range of potentially
relevant evidence was enormous. A policy patently intended to cause
segregation and effective in doing so would readily establish liability.
In the more common case, however, where officials did not express
racist intentions, policies were facially neutral, and their consequences
were ambiguous, the going was harder. Even when liability was established, doctrine generally confined the courts' remedial powers to
official conduct within the district. Where the district was residentially segregated, or where whites would respond to remedial efforts by
fleeing, options were severely restricted. Since the late 197os, a sense
of fatigue and futility has hung over large-scale desegregation efforts.' 9
A second line of school cases has focused on fiscal equity. Although
the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that the federal
20
Equal Protection Clause limits inequality in state school finance,
many state courts have struck down school finance systems under state
constitutional provisions. In total, the courts of about half the states
have held school finance systems unconstitutional.2 1 Although equalization of funding is a less daunting remedial task than desegregation
in a residentially segregated region, implementation of school finance
equity remedies has also met with difficulties and disappointments.
Some states, most notably California, seem to have moved toward
increasing relative contributions to
equality by leveling down poorer districts but limiting overall support for the school system.2 2 In

F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from
School Desegregationin the South, 199o-2ooo, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (2003).
19 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 83-90 (1995) (intemperately reversing as beyond
the district court's remedial powers its mandate of elaborate and expensive efforts to integrate
Kansas City schools by inducing voluntary transfers of white suburban students); Morgan v.
Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 315-17, 321 (ist Cir. 1987) (upholding the district court's renunciation of efforts to achieve racial balance in the Boston schools on the ground that segregation was rooted in
"intractable demographic obstacles").
20 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 54-55 (s973).
21 See Advocacy Ctr. for Children's Educational Success with Standards, Status of School
Funding Litigations in the 50 States (June 27, 2003) (reporting "Plaintiff Victory" in school funding cases in twenty-five states), available at http:/www.accessednetwork.org/litigation/Tableof
LitigationStatusfor5ostates.pdf.
22 See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465, 466
(1989) (describing leveling-down in California).
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other states, increased funding has 23not made a discernible difference in
the performance of poorer districts.
In both the desegregation and fiscal equity cases, the courts have
felt compelled to address issues of educational quality. The premise of
Brown v. Board of Education was that segregation was bad - not
only in itself, but also because it made for bad education.14 Desegregation, conversely, was expected to produce better education. Where desegregation appeared unattainable, direct educational improvement
seemed an appropriate alternative remedy. Moreover, to the extent desegregation required inducements to whites to remain voluntarily in
urban public schools, direct quality improvements could supply them.
Thus, the logical link between desegregation and quality ran in both
directions.
Remedial practice evolved along with these substantive developments. The implementation of desegregation pushed the courts toward
extensive oversight of school administration. Concern for pupil assignment followed directly from the concern with integration. Given
the strong connection between race and residence, and the tradition of
local school attendance, the courts could not ignore siting decisions for
new schools. The courts also had to make efforts to ensure that minority children were not mistreated or tacitly disadvantaged in new
schools by, for example, excessive discipline or failure to discipline others who harassed them. Moreover, since minority students would
likely be more at ease in a school with minority teachers, personnel
policies became relevant. Once the courts saw improving educational
quality as a remedial goal, almost every aspect of education policy was
potentially relevant. When defendants were recalcitrant, the courts
tended to increase both the scope and the detail of their orders. Thus,
detailed regulatory codes
consent decrees often took the form of highly
2 S
administration.
of
provinces
vast
embracing
23 See Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and Controversies About the Effectiveness of School
Resources, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Mar. 1998, at I5-i6; cf. Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359, 374-75 (N.J. 199o) (mandating increased funding while acknowledging that "no
amount of money may be able to erase the impact of the socioeconomic factors that define and
cause these pupils' disadvantages").
24 See 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
25 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, 22-31 (197) (upholding a decree addressing racial quotas, the presence of one-race schools, attendance zoning, and
student transportation); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 232-37
(1969) (upholding an order prescribing certain ratios of minority students to nonminority students); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 12 17-19 (5th Cir. i97o) (per curiam)
(upholding a decree addressing staff desegregation, student transfers, transportation, new school
construction, and inter-school-system attendance); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 265-70
(D. Mass. 1975) (requiring the development of committees and the issuance of detailed reports and
proposing a detailed timetable); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 647, 65456 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (ordering a desegregation plan addressing faculty and staff, new school con-
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The concern with quality is most prominent in the third wave of
cases. These are state cases of recent years, based not (or not only) on
equality norms, but on provisions of a sort found in most state constitutions requiring "an adequate public education, ' 26 "a thorough and
efficient system of free schools, "27 or "an educational program of high
quality. '2 8 In these cases, the state's failure to meet norms of minimal
29
quality and efficacy is the focus of the plaintiff's claim.
Where courts have found liability in these cases, legislatures have
responded with both funding and structural support, though frequently not to the satisfaction of the courts or the parties. These judicial efforts have sometimes converged with extensive civic activity
around educational reform. In Kentucky and Texas, for example, lawsuits drew on the activities of politically appointed commissions of
business, professional, and civic leaders. 30 Civic participation in the
remedial phase of school reform litigation is not new, but it seemed to
assume greater prominence in both practice and theory in the 199os.
Picking up a theme from our colleague Susan Sturm, counsel in the
New York school finance case argued in 1996 that the widespread involvement of parents, teachers, business, and civic groups in the formulation and implementation of remedies was critical to the success of
these suits. They proposed a "dialogic" model of reform in which
remedies emerge from deliberation among the widest feasible range of
31
stakeholders.
The remedial regimes in the more ambitious of these new public
law cases do not involve the comprehensive sets of regulatory instructions of the sort found in many urban desegregation cases. The new
regimes do not contemplate judicial micromanagement or administrative centralization. Helen Hershkoff described one of these decrees,
from an Alabama case, as "establishing a structure for institutional re-

struction, and transportation); see also Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV 428, 457 (1977) ("The court order should be quantitative and precise,
including timetables for the achievement of specific tasks.").
Looking back at the school desegregation precedents in a public housing case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote:
[Als injunctions meet with indifference or violation on the part of the defendant officials,
there is justification for the more detailed directions further confining ... discretion....
The rule of thumb may be that the more indurated the violations of law and the remedial injunction, the more imperative and controlling the later superseding injunction.
Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 4oo N.E.2d 1231, 1249 (Mass. i98o) (Kaplan, J.) (citations omitted).
26 GA. CONST. art VIii, § i, para. i.
27 W. VA. CONST. art XII, § i.
28 VA. CONST. art. VIII, § i.
29 See Heise, supra note 17, at 1153; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 202-07.
30 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 233-34, 243-44, 25 1-55.
31 See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dia-

logic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 99, 114-36 (1996).
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form, and [yet] not fixing the precise content of [the] reform. '3 2 Instead of directing specific action, the decrees elaborate goals and
methods of monitoring achievement.
These more ambitious regimes have been influenced by the "new
accountability" movement in educational reform. That movement results from the interaction of both centralizing and decentralizing developments. The centralizing theme emphasizes the importance of
comparative performance measurement and material incentives. The
decentralizing theme prescribes devolution of authority for classroom
instruction away from national and state administrators toward districts, principals, and teachers (and sometimes parents). The combination of standards-based monitoring and local discretion is designed to
33
reconcile systematic accountability with local authority.

The Texas regime is one of the more fully developed along these
lines. In 1989 the Texas Supreme Court declared the state's school
system out of compliance with various provisions of the state's constitution, including the requirement that the state provide for an "efficient [school] system" and the "general diffusion of knowledge." It
subsequently rejected two legislative packages enacted specifically to
fix the problems. Then in 1995 the court provisionally accepted a new
statutory scheme increasing funding and creating the Texas Public
School System Accountability scheme. 34 The statute put the state's
Board of Education in charge of the system. The Board is charged
with designing "assessment instruments" to test student knowledge in
basic subjects and skills and with administering them at specified
points in students' careers. Schools are obliged to plan and target resources specifically to improve the performance of their lowest-scoring
students, regardless of their race.
Under the Texas scheme, schools and school districts are assessed
annually on the basis of both test scores and other indicators, such as
dropout and graduation rates, attendance rates, SAT scores, and completion of advanced courses.
Relative performance is measured
against a group of peer schools with comparable characteristics in

32 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, ij2 HARV. L. REV. 1131 , 119o (1999) (describing Harperv. Hunt, No. CV-9 1-otI7-R
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Apr. i, 1993)). Harper v. Hunt was consolidated with Alabama
Coalitionfor Equity, Inc. v. Hunt and reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d
107, io

(Ala. 1993).

33 The background of the "new accountability" movement is described in Liebman & Sabel,
supra note i6, at 2 14-31.
34 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725-30 (Tex. 1995); see also TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. ch. 39 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004) (setting forth the standards and duties
under the Public School System Accountability program). Both the Texas scheme and the Kentucky one, which has many comparable features, are described in Liebman & Sabel, supra note
16, at 231-66.
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terms of such indicators as "past academic performance, socioeconomic
status, ethnicity, and limited English proficiency." Outstanding performers are identified and rewarded. Laggards must, with the help of
outside technical assistance, develop detailed improvement plans. In
the case of continued poor performance, such schools are put into state
35
receivership or reconstituted.
The Texas process is substantially transparent, with school and district ratings and related information available on the Internet. Parents
receive "report cards" on their children's schools through the mail.
The state supreme court cases provoked substantial mobilization by
business and civic groups. At least in some areas, it appears that the
reforms have prompted extensive local parental involvement in school
36
affairs.
The new accountability approach is widely regarded as the most
promising recent development in public school reform. Some jurisdictions have adopted related initiatives without judicial compulsion. 37
Although it is too soon to claim that the judicial efforts along this line
have been successes, there are several jurisdictions where the courts
remain key participants in the most ambitious reform efforts.
Finally, we note that trends parallel to those seen in these general
education initiatives are evident in the subfield of special education for
students with disabilities. The federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 38 and various state statutes create duties to refrain from
discrimination against disabled students, to make affirmative accommodations for them, and to respond to requests for services on their
behalf in accordance with prescribed procedures. Here, too, early
structural reform litigation seems to have taken on a command-andcontrol orientation involving elaborate rule-bound administrative regimes focused on such matters as the timeliness of processing student
evaluations, the number and qualifications of personnel, and student
placement practices. Practitioners subsequently became dissatisfied
with what some characterized as the "input-oriented" approach in both
35 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.

§§

39.023-028, 39.051-.54,

39.071-.076,

39-093--095,

39-131

(Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004).
36 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note i6, at 233-34, 243-46. Not all forms of public participation or "engagement" have this decentralized character. Sometimes such efforts are designed simply to produce information about parent preferences or school practices for use by centralized or-

ganizational structures or to generate grassroots support for programs that already have been
worked out by those in control of the litigation. The use of focus groups modeled on electoral
campaign practices seems more like top-down mobilization than the development of permanent
local participatory capacity contemplated by the more ambitious reforms.
37 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified

in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), which was inspired by the Texas approach, mandates or encourages adoption of some of its features nationwide. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 6, at
283-300.
38 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
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judicial and administrative oversight. 39 In the spirit of the new accountability approach in general education, the 1997 amendments to
the federal special education statute required states to set achievement
40
goals and to measure progress with standardized tests.
The emerging "output-oriented" perspective is evident in Vaughn G.
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. In 2000, when the case was
nearly two decades old, the parties agreed that the complexity of the
decree hampered both enforcement and renegotiation efforts. Noncompliance was pervasive, and both plaintiffs and defendants were
mired in arguments over small details that distracted them from their
central goals. They thus agreed to replace their detailed "Long Range
Compliance Plan" with a "Consent Order Approving Ultimate Measurable Outcomes." The six-page order prescribes sixteen outcomes
and specifies procedures for measuring progress toward attaining
them. Some of the outcomes involve data collection and monitoring
systems for performance measurement; others involve procedural
norms, and here, compliance rates are specified (for example, the order
requires ninety-five percent compliance with application processing
deadlines).
The other outcomes Vaughn G. prescribes concern educational
goals. For example, the defendants committed to increase school completion rates for disabled students from fifty percent to fifty-seven percent within three years, to increase the participation of disabled students in vocational programs to the same rate as that of nondisabled
students, and to provide at least eighty percent of disabled students
with required services in the schools they would attend if they were
not disabled. These norms were derived from statewide data on special education performance, with negotiated adjustments. The defendants' performance under the new approach has been mixed, but it
seems to have improved, and the plaintiffs find that their own moni4
toring efforts are more focused.

1

39 See Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism to Collaboration, in
LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL

EQUITY

205, 234 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
40 See 2o U.S.C. § 1412(a)(i6)-(I7) (2ooo).
41 See Consent Order Approving Ultimate Measurable Outcomes, Vaughn G., No. 84-1911 (D.
Md. filed May 4, 2oo) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Telephone Interview with
Donna Wulkan, Plaintiff's Counsel, Vaughn G. (March 17, 2003); Telephone Interview with Thomas Hehir, Court-Appointed Expert, Vaughn G. (May 20, 2003). Hehir, a Harvard education
scholar who strongly influenced the shift of remedial orientation in Vaughn G., is helping to develop a similar approach in a pending Los Angeles special education case, Smith v. Los Angeles
Unified School District, CV 9 3 -7044-LEW (GHKx) (C.D. Cal.). Regarding an earlier effort in
this vein, see Michael A. Rebell, Allen v. McDonough: Special Education Reform in Boston, in
JUSTICE AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN EDUCATION LITIGATION
70, 74-87 (Barbara Flicker ed., 199o).

20041

DESTABILIZATION RIGHTS

1029

B. Mental Health
Mental health is probably the least controversial category of institutional reform litigation. To be sure, the characteristic judicial experience in this realm has involved the same delay, frustration, and recalcitrance that have plagued efforts in other areas. But at least
moderate success is widely conceded in several cases involving developmentally disabled clients. Coincidentally or not, the evolution with
which we are concerned - from command-and-control intervention to
decentralized and indirect intervention - is especially marked and
self-conscious in these cases.
The contours of mental health institutional litigation were shaped
by two converging developments. The first was the emergence of a legal doctrine recognizing the rights of people involuntarily confined on
grounds of mental disability to treatment and decent conditions. Beginning in the Ig6os, the courts articulated such rights as a matter of
constitutional law. These rights were elaborated further in state and
federal legislation. Congress specifically authorized the Department of
Justice to bring suits against mental health institutions in the Civil
Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act of I98O, and the Department
has done so, with less zeal than activists would like but considerably
more than it has shown in the case of prisons. Procedural barriers of
the sort created by courts and legislatures for prison litigation have
42
generally not arisen in the mental health field.

The second development was the deinstitutionalization movement.
The intellectual origins of this movement are in the treating professions. Reformers argued that most mentally disabled people held in
large, public institutions would fare better as outpatients or as residents of small community facilities. Institutionalization limited the
range of their personal associations and activities in ways that were
stifling and oppressive, and hence impeded rehabilitation. More integration into normal social life would have therapeutic advantages.
Small, community-based facilities might be more accessible to formal
and informal monitoring by relatives and advocacy groups than large,
43
isolated ones.
The professional critique of institutionalization meshed with the
libertarian impulse of the legal doctrine on confinement. Liberal lawyers argued for a right to the "least restrictive" efficacious intervention.
This meant that institutionalization was impermissible when community placement was adequate or better. Although the Supreme Court
42 See generally 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

3-152 (2d ed. 1999); 3 PERLIN, supra, at 145-281 (2d ed. 2000).
43 See generally DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS (Richard Lamb &
Linda Weinberger eds., 2003).
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never fully accepted this principle as constitutional law, statutory and
44
regulatory support for it did emerge.
Strong fiscal incentives also supported deinstitutionalization. The
1970s were a time of fiscal pressure, and even the shabbiest mental
health institutions were expensive. The prospect of savings from clos45
ing them was appealing to state and local governments.
The move to community facilities had a natural affinity with decentralized, indirect administrative structures. Although public agencies sometimes created and managed their own community facilities,
more often they looked to nongovernmental social service agencies or
for-profit providers to do so. Even administrators wedded to command-and-control models within government did not think them applicable to public subcontracting of services. As Ronald Wisor put it:
[The move to community facilities] dramatically transforms the government's function from provider to guarantor of care. In this new role, the

state's primary responsibility is to establish detailed quality control standards as the basis for the provider contracts, and then to monitor per46
formance closely to ensure that those standards are followed.

Thus, the mental health cases focused on two kinds of reforms:
First, as long as the large public institutions remained open, the courts
sought to bring them into compliance with minimum standards of
safety, sanitation, humane conduct, and effective medical treatment.
Second, courts sought to gradually replace these institutions with community care facilities. The change in remedial orientation from old to
new public law can be seen both within the efforts to change the older
institutions and in the shift to the community care model.
The command-and-control orientation is evident in the decrees in
47
two of the most famous mental health cases - Wyatt v. Stickney,
which addressed Alabama's institutions for the psychiatrically and developmentally disabled, and New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,4* which involved the Willowbrook institution for the
developmentally disabled in New York City. Each decree declared
many rights and duties in general terms, such as a patient's right to
"privacy" and a duty to provide "adequate" medical care. Each also
incorporated, by reference, the presumably changing standards promulgated by organizations with relevant expertise. For example, the
44 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. i4, § 36.4(c)(2) (2003) (requiring a placement
plan for discharged mental patients to attempt to "capitalize on strengths to enable the least re-

strictive community placement possible"); id. § 5 86,i(b) ("Community residences are ... operated
to implement the principle of the 'least restrictive alternative."').
45 See 3 PERLIN, supra note 42, at 65-74.
46 Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective on
PrivatizedMental Health Care, i9 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 154-55 (I993).
47 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
48 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Alabama decree required a diet meeting nutritional standards prescribed by the National Academy of Science.
As to a broad range of matters, however, the decrees dictated directly and specifically. The Wyatt decree, for example, mandated at
least one toilet for every eight patients, no more than six patients in a
bedroom, at least eighty square feet of floor space per patient in each
bedroom, at least ten square feet of space per person in the dining
room, air temperature between eighty-three and sixty-eight degrees
Fahrenheit, hot water at i io degrees, and minimum staff-patient ratios
49
for thirty-five job categories.
Five years after the entry of this decree, the defendants petitioned
for modification, claiming that the court-ordered procedures were excessively rigid. Various recordkeeping and monitoring procedures,
they asserted, were "ritualistic and meaningless." Moreover, many of
the treatment standards proved senseless. For example, the requirement of six hours of training per day for each resident was inappropriate for some profoundly retarded residents (who came to constitute the
majority of inmates as less disabled residents were transferred to
community placements). These patients had shown no capacity to
benefit from such extensive training, and it sometimes became an unpleasant and demeaning experience for them. The court denied the
motion, however, holding that the provisions in question, including the
six-hour training requirement, were essential to the "constitutional
right" of each resident to effective treatment. s °
In the Willowbrook case, the defendants fought successfully against
many specific requirements5 but accepted some restrictions that were
important to the plaintiffs. One of the latter provisions proved especially contentious. The consent decree required that mildly retarded
members of the plaintiff class be transferred to community placements
with no more than fifteen beds and that members with more severe
disabilities be transferred to placements with no more than ten beds.
A few years later, the defendants asked the court to modify the decree
to permit patient transfers to facilities with as many as fifty beds.
They argued that small community facilities had proven harder to develop than anticipated and that the therapeutic benefits of the larger
settings were comparable. Like its counterpart in Alabama, the federal district court in New York denied the request, but its decision was
reversed on appeal by the Second Circuit. The circuit court cited a re49) See

Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 379-86; id. at 395-407.
50 The defendant's motion and the court's ruling are reprinted in i PAUL R. FRIEDMAN,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 813-6o (1979).

See id. at 816-17,822-33,

853-55.
51 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 114-19
(1984).
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cent Supreme Court opinion suggesting that treatment consistent with
"professional judgment" was sufficient for constitutional purposes, and
rejecting a claim of a right to the least restrictive alternative S 2 However, the court relied equally on the principle of deference to adminisS3
trative officials on matters within the scope of their discretion.
In some respects, the Wyatt defendants probably had the better argument. The Wyatt court's refusal to modify its order in light of experience seems to have reflected its strong distrust of the defendants
more than any view of the merits. Conversely, the Second Circuit's insistence on deference a decade later seemed based mainly on anxiety
that courts were being drawn into institutional micromanagement and
resolution of public policy issues over which they had no distinctive
expertise.
Recent public law cases in mental health forego this type of specification in favor of more indirect modes of control. The decrees emphasize broad goals and leave the defendants substantial latitude to determine how to achieve them; mandate precise measurement and
reporting with respect to achievement; and institutionalize ongoing
mechanisms of reassessment, discipline, and participation.
The recent decree in a long-pending challenge to conditions at the
District of Columbia institution for the mentally disabled is illustrative
of this trend. The "Compliance Plan" negotiated by the parties and
approved by the court specifically eschewed "detailed prescriptions of
policies and procedures and staff training." Instead, it adopted
...

[a]n alternative approach...

,

where the parties and experts that they rec-

ommend, have a meaningful opportunity to provide input into proposed
policies and training initiatives prior to their adoption and . . . the defen-

dants give careful consideration to such input. In each section of the Plan
where a need for new or revised policies and procedures is identified, the
Plan requires that the process of policy-making will involve close collabo-

ration with the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor [the U.S. Department
of Justice], and experts whom they recommend, prior to the adoption of
these policies and procedures. However, the final decision about the policies and procedures and training programs will remain with the defendants, understanding that if they fail to address serious concerns raised by
the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor, this may result in compliance issues down the road. In the final analysis, it is compliance with the spe-

cific outcome criteria that is required ... and the tasks identified are a
54
means to this end.
52 N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982)); see also infra pp. 1087-88.
53 See Carey, 7o6 F.2d at 965.
54 2ooi Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams at 6-7 (Civil Action No. 76
293 SSH) (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 2ooi) (footnotes omitted) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library) [hereinafter D.C. Plan], adopted in Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C.
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The plan consists of a series of generally stated "goals" (for example, "Appropriate Individualized Habilitation and Treatment in the
Community in the Least Separate, Most Integrated, and Least Restrictive Setting"). Each goal is followed by a series of specific "tasks" (for
example, preparing individual service plans at least annually for each
patient) and "outcome criteria" (for example, that the patient receive
the services identified in the individual service plan). The plan then
specifies the "method of assessing compliance" for each set of outcome
criteria. Compliance with the service provision goal is to be assessed
by review of a computerized database of individual service plan information, documents regarding complaints, direct observation of a
random sample of ten percent of the patients in the programs, and interviews with case managers and advocates.
These plans, as elaborated, do not consistently live up to their rhetorical commitment to focus on "outcomes." An outcome is something
desirable in itself, such as psychic well-being, physical health, or living
skills. Often, however, the plans do not seek to measure these desiderata in the way that the new school regimes try to measure learning.
The "outcomes" the mental health plans measure are really procedures.
The D.C. plan, for example, measures whether services have been appropriately prescribed and provided in accordance with that prescription, not whether the services have actually improved the life of the
recipient. It is a matter of controversy whether this hesitation reflects
the difficulties of devising true outcome measures in this field, or the
failure of practitioners to appreciate the full potential of the approach
they have embraced in principle.15 In any event, even in its compromised form, the intent and effect of such plans is to reduce reliance on
specific ex ante rules.
The D.C. plan institutionalizes short-run participation of the plaintiff class through periodic meetings with the defendant officials conducted by a special master, or "Independent Court Monitor." It also
creates a permanent institution designed to facilitate accountability to
patients and their families. This institution is a freestanding nonprofit
corporation, the Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities. The
District committed to endow the Quality Trust with $i i million at the
outset and to provide it with between $1-5 to $2 million a year for ten

2ooi). A comparable example is the Remedial Plan adopted in United States v. Connecticut, No.
N-86-252 (D. Conn. order of Apr. 2 1, 1998) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).

55 No doubt measurement of psychic well-being is difficult and contested. However, the D.C.
plan ignores some easily measured outcomes in favor of less direct measures. For example, compliance with the goal of preventing accidental and intentional physical harm is measured only in
terms of adherence to policies for reporting, investigating, and following up on incidents of injury.
The "outcome criteria" do not include the number and seriousness of instances of harm, which is
surely the most pertinent "outcome." D.C. Plan, supra note 54, at 31-32.
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years. The board of the trust was appointed by the mayor from a list
jointly developed by the parties, and subsequent vacancies are to be
filled by a vote of the remaining incumbents. The trust has a broad
mandate to monitor the District's programs for the developmentally
disabled and to advocate on behalf of patients. This includes the
power to take the District to court. Most important, the trust has
broad access to information on the performance of the District's programs for the developmentally disabled.
Such judicial interventions seem to have made a difference for the
better. Horrific conditions in many custodial institutions have been
ameliorated, and many patients have been transferred to community
facilities that offer improved conditions and are subject to promising
monitoring regimes. 5 6 To be sure, no case has come close to fulfilling
the hopes of those who brought it, and the public mental health system
remains plagued by disastrous failings. Many of those formerly incarcerated in large institutions have been released into the community
without adequate shelter or care. Some have simply been abandoned,
others left at the mercy of poorly monitored or underpaid subcontractors. It would be unfair, however, to blame these failings on institutional reform litigation.
C. Prisons
Challenges to the Arkansas prison system in 1969 and the Texas
system in 1972 inaugurated a period of massive judicial intervention in

56 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 995 F. Supp. 534, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(finding substantial improvement for class members from changes ordered in the Pennsylvania
litigation); L. RALPH JONES & RICHARD R. PARLOUR, WYATT V STICKNEY: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT, at xi-xii (ig8I) (noting positive changes after Wyatt); ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN,
supra note Si, at 177-2 19 (describing successful efforts to develop community placements and a
subcontractor monitoring system under the Willowbrook decree); Wisor, supra note 46, at 152-53
(favorably appraising the system of community placements and subcontractor monitoring established under a consent decree in Massachusetts litigation, though also noting that litigation's
power to bring about such change is "quite limited").
A recent New York Times investigation of New York community care facilities for psychiatrically disabled individuals (as opposed to developmentally disabled plaintiffs, as in Willowbrook)
found appalling conditions. See Clifford J. Levy, For Mentally Ill, Death and Misery, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at Ai; Clifford J. Levy, Voiceless, Defenseless and a Source of Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, at Ai. The findings illustrate the importance of vigorous monitoring in
any system providing services to vulnerable persons. The Willowbrook class members appear to
have fared much better. The consent decree provides for two protections not available to nonclass members: First, a Consumer Advocacy Board, whose membership is appointed by the state
from lists of candidates submitted by the plaintiffs and which has a full-time staff of thirty, advocates on behalf of residents. Second, the Medicaid service coordinators with responsibility for
class members have caseloads of only twenty, half the usual number. Telephone Interview with
Beth Haroules, Staff Attorney, New York Civil Liberties Union, and Counsel to the Willowbrook
Class Cince 1994 (Oct. 2002); E-Mail from David J. Rothman, Professor of History, Columbia
University, and Consultant to the Willowbrook Class, to William H. Simon (July 2002).
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the nation's prisons and jails. Prison conditions in forty-one states
were held unconstitutional, as were conditions in hundreds of jails
throughout the country. In ten states, Malcolm Feeley and Edward
Rubin report, judicial intervention was "directed at virtually every aspect of every institution in the state." They continue:
[F]ederal courts ended up promulgating a comprehensive code for prison
management, covering such diverse matters as residence facilities, sanitation, food, clothing, medical care, discipline, staff hiring, libraries, work,
and education. The decisions themselves, and often the resulting body of
law, specify many requirements in what can be described, depending on
one's perspective, as painstaking or excruciating detail; the wattage of the
light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of showers, and the caloric content

of meals are all part of the code that the federal courts have promulgated.

57

The implementation phase of many of these cases has lasted for decades.
On the whole, these cases seem to have spurred significant improvement. Especially in the harshest systems in the South, intervention has led to the elimination of the routine or authorized use of torture; to the abandonment of convict-leasing, inmate "trusties," and
other managerial structures with high potential for abuse; to personnel,
training, and supervisory changes that professionalized management;
and to modest improvement, at least, in the physical amenity of confinement. Although many of the institutions are still foul and dangerous places, they are better than they used to be in many ways.5 8
Reform was assisted in some respects but hampered in others by
the fact that it occurred amidst a policy-induced explosion of the
prison population. On the one hand, the upheaval created by rushed
expansion opened the system to change. It meant an influx of new
personnel and created pressure, independent of the plaintiffs' demands, for more effective managerial structures. On the other hand,
expansion and upheaval also increased fiscal pressures. The reformers
had to find resources to fund improvements for current prisoners at a
time when the system was expanding to accommodate additional ones.
Writing in 1990, Susan Sturm found some indications of a shift
away from command-and-control and toward experimentalist regulation (or what she called the "catalyst approach").5 9 She pointed to
cases in Hawaii and Pennsylvania in which courts, instead of imposing
comprehensive sets of specific rules, ordered the parties and their ex-

57 FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6, at 40-41.
58 Id. at 73, 93-95.
59 Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 856-59 (1990).
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perts to formulate general performance standards and then to set up
monitoring bodies with substantial accountability to the plaintiffs. 60
At about this time, a movement to privatize prison services got underway. This movement involved subcontracting practices analogous
to those in the mental health field, though their scale was more modest. Such efforts most commonly concerned low-security, serviceintensive facilities, such as halfway houses or pre-release centers, or
medical services in secure institutions. Subcontracting sometimes led
to standard-setting and monitoring practices like those in mental
health institutions. It freed some ambitious administrators from the
rigidities associated with civil service rules, union practices, and a
workforce immured in convention. According to J. Michael Keating,
Jr., some administrators viewed subcontracting as "an opportunity not
only to identify and clarify goals, but also to create incentive structures
designed to promote the attainment of these goals. '61 (Of course, if
unsupervised by public authorities, privatization also opens the way to
abuse.) Such efforts increased support for emerging national accreditation processes, especially those of the American Correctional Association and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care of the
62
American Medical Association.

A further development was the formation in several states, through
legislative or administrative initiative, of administrative bodies to
monitor prisons. Typically, such bodies operate both by responding to
grievances and through proactive auditing. Injunctive remedies in

60 See id. at 859 (discussing Jackson v. Hendrick, 321 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1974); and Spear v. Ariyosha, No. 84-1104 (D. Haw. June I2,1985)).
61 J.Michael Keating, Jr., Public over Private:Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 130, 134 (Douglas C.
McDonald ed., 199o).
62 An important part of the American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation process is
a set of about one hundred "Outcome Measures," including "[n]umber of worker compensation
claims filed for injuries that resulted from the physical environment" (divided by the number of
staff positions); "[n]umber of instances in which force was used" (divided by the offender population); and "[n]umber of offenders released in the past i2 months who continue substance abuse
treatment for six months after release" (divided by the number of offenders released in the past i2
months). The adjustments in parentheses are designed to make the numbers comparable across
institutions. See Am. Corr. Ass'n, ACRS Outcome Measure Worksheet, available at http://www.
aca.orglimages/form-acrsoutcome.pdf (last visited Jan. 1I, 2004).
Prisoner advocates disparage ACA accreditation, emphasizing that the process includes only
corrections personnel and that audits are not public. They also fault the ACA for lax compliance
monitoring. See, e.g., Elizabeth Alexander, What's Wrong With the ACA?, 15 NAT'L PRISON L.
PROJECT J. I (2ooi); Telephone Interview with David Fathi, Staff Attorney, ACLU Prison Project
(July I8, 2oo2). However, consent decrees sometimes incorporate ACA standards into more elaborate customized monitoring regimes. See William J. Rich, Prison Conditions and Criminal Sentencing in Kansas: A Public Policy Dialogue, ii KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 693, 702-04 (2002);
Telephone Interview with Mellie Nelson, Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Section of the Civil
Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 23, 2002).
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lawsuits sometimes also provide for the creation of these monitoring
63
bodies.

These efforts were never as ambitious as the comparable initiatives
in education and mental health. There is, of course, much stronger
public resistance to participation in policymaking and administration
by prisoners and their advocates than by mental health patients and
their advocates, and a fortiori, by parents of schoolchildren. And the
natural resistance of administrators to public disclosure of performance data has been less subject to challenge in the prison sphere.
A powerful backlash against judicial intervention developed in the
late ig8os. Since then, Supreme Court cases and congressional enactments have prescribed deference to administrative expertise and have
insisted that judicial intervention be narrowly circumscribed. For example, one Supreme Court case reversing lower court prison injunctions vehemently condemned the level of detail (as well as the scope) of
an injunction regarding prison libraries:
It specified in minute detail the times that libraries were to be kept open,
the number of hours of library use to which each inmate was entitled (Io
per week), the minimal educational requirements for prison librarians (a
of a
library science degree, law degree, or paralegal degree), the content 64
videotaped legal-research course for inmates... , and similar matters.

All the Justices agreed that this went too far.

In 1996, Congress stepped in and enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which imposed an array of procedural restraints on such

litigation in the federal courts. 65 As in the mental health field, appel63 For administrative bodies, see, for example, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 6125-6129 (Deering
2003) (creating an Inspector General for prisons); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.315(6) (West 2003) (creat-

ing the Florida Corrections Commission); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 251 (West 2003) (specifying
the practices and procedures of the Commission on Jail Standards).
For litigation remedies providing for monitoring procedures, see the consent decrees in
United States v. Michigan, No. 9 7 -CVB- 7 I 5 I 4 -BDT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, '999), and
United States v. Arizona, No. 9 7 - 4 7 6-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Mar. ii, 1999) (providing for grievance procedures for complaints of sexual misconduct and creating an administrative office
to monitor the process and recommend systemic responses to recurring problems), both available
See also Settlement Agreement,
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/findsettle.htm#Settlements.
United States v. Nassau County Sheriff's Dep't (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Nassau
County Settlement Agreement] (providing for the creation of a "quality assurance and improvement" system for medical and mental health care), http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplit/documents/
Nassasher-agreem.htm.
64 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 347 (1996). Justice Thomas describes the decree in more detail
over three pages of his concurrence. See id. at 390-92 (Thomas, J., concurring).
65 Pub. L. No. 104-134, iio Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000);
at i8 U.S.C. §§ 3 62 4 (b), 3626 (2ooo); and in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). The statute
requires, among other things, that injunctions against prison administrators be "the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation"; that after two years courts vacate injunctions on the
defendant's motion unless the plaintiffs prove continuing violations; that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies; that prisoners be sanctioned for "frivolous" petitions; that damage actions
be dismissed unless physical injury is alleged; and that court-awarded attorneys' fees be subject to
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late courts became increasingly intolerant of lower court orders that
imposed detailed restrictions, such as minimum space requirements, or
restrictions only indirectly related to the legal violations, such as train66
ing or staffing requirements.
Despite a growing number of legal and political constraints, however, the volume of prison litigation remains substantial, and although
structural orders tend to be narrower than in the past, they are still
common. 67 Among these structural orders, at least some seem to have
moved toward more experimentalist modes of intervention.
Consider Sheppard v. Phoenix,68 a challenge to use-of-force practices in maximum security units of the New York City jails. In 1998,
the parties entered a settlement obligating the Department of Corrections to develop and implement new policies under the guidance of two
designated experts with extensive prison reform experience and within
broad parameters set out in a 104-paragraph "stipulation." In its report on the implementation process, the court noted that "the Stipulation ... was implemented to achieve its goals, not to restrict it to its
'69
exact terms.
Although the Department adopted extensive written policies, the
court's report emphasized the process of ongoing revision, training,
and monitoring, not the specifics of the policies. Monitoring efforts included an improved inmate grievance system, handheld videotaping of
anticipated uses of force, cameras mounted in secluded places where
incidents were likely to occur, detailed reporting and investigation procedures for each incident, and oversight by the Department's Inspector
General, an officer independent of the staff line of authority. As problimits not applicable to most civil rights actions. See generally John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act, in 1 16TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 687, 693 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Series, Course Handbook Series No. H-6 4 o, 2000) (summarizing PLRA
doctrine); David M. Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The "Iron Triangle" of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, ioi COLUM. L. REV. i68i, 1685-87 (2001) (discussing PLRA's exhaustion

requirement).

Comparable state legislation has inhibited state court litigation in some jurisdic-

tions. See Christopher E. Smith, The Governance of Corrections:Implications of the Changing
Interface of Courts and Corrections, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000: BOUNDARY CHANGES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 113, 141 (Charles M.

Friel ed., 2000).

66 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d iii5, 1144, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing decree provisions requiring no more than one inmate per cell and reorganizing the prison's management
structure).
67 In 1984, 24.3 percent of state prison facilities were subject to court orders; in 2000, 22.7 percent were. The figures for jails were I5.1percent in 1984 and 13.4 percent in 2ooo. The change
in the scope of orders is more marked. One-third of prison orders in 1984 reported twelve to thirteen regulated matters, and one-third reported one to three. By 1995, however, only 20 percent
reported twelve or more regulated matters, and nearly two-thirds reported one to three. Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation After the Deluge: Part II, Court Order Cases 9, 19 (July 26, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
68 2io F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
69 Id. at 452.
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lems were disclosed, policies were revised. For example, incident reports showed that a large number of violent altercations between inmates and guards arose from inmate refusals to close food slots. These
refusals, often accompanied by shouting, were considered disruptive
and frequently prompted the guards to enter the cells to force compliance. Inquiry disclosed that these inmates were often protesting failures to address legitimate demands for services. The Department responded by providing training for guards on the appropriate reaction
to service requests and by assigning social services counselors to the
unit. Inmates who repeatedly refused to close their boxes were placed
in specially designed cells that minimized inmate-guard contact.70
The court based its dismissal of the stipulation on measured performance improvement. Measures included the number of injuries,
the number of use-of-force incidents, the processing times for investigations and disciplinary charges against guards, and guard sick days
and worker's compensation claims (which the court treated as a proxy
for both physical welfare and morale).7" The court talked only about
the internal trend. It made no comparative assessment and did not
explain why the current scores should be deemed adequate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the court defined compliance by performance in relation to basic goals, not by conformity to rules.
While agreeing that the jails had made important progress, plaintiffs' counsel in Sheppard have pointed to areas where compliance has
lagged. The specificity of their criticisms demonstrates, however, that
the monitoring system already in place is sufficiently informative to
guide further reforms. Plaintiffs' counsel can, for example, document
a tendency for use-of-force incidents to rise when new staff arrive,
leading them to recommend changes in the training and supervision of
recruits. They can also attribute specific reporting failures to specific
personnel and monitor the sanctions applied for violations of the decree.7 2
Platav. Davis, one in a series of recent challenges to prison medical
care, points to a similar degree of progress.7 3 In a widely noted settlement, the California Department of Corrections agreed to structural
relief centered on a quality assurance system with significant accountability to outside professionals and the plaintiff class. The stipulated
relief in Plata contains virtually no substantive commands. Rather,

70 Id. at 455.
71 See id. at 456-6o.
72 See Plaintiffs' Report to the Court on the Stipulation of the Settlement, Sheppard v. PhoeniX, 2io F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 91 Civ. 4148 (RPP)).
73 Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, Plata v. Davis, No. C-oI-I35I TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
2002) [hereinafter Plata Stipulation], available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/platastip.pdf. For
another case in this vein, see Nassau County Settlement Agreement, supra note 63.
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the defendants have agreed to promulgate written policies and to
monitor adherence to them in specified ways.
First, the plan provides for a panel of experts, to be agreed upon by
the parties, and for the development by the parties and the experts together of an "Audit Instrument" to score compliance with the policies.
The plan also specifies the minimum number of cases to be audited,
their manner of selection, a procedure for resolving disputes among the
auditors, and the minimum score required for compliance. The plaintiffs are entitled to seek unspecified further relief in the event of noncompliance.
The Audit Instrument has about 125 compliance elements. Many
are procedural, and these tend to take a rule-like form typical of old
public law: Were patients seen within specified time frames? Was the
complaint and medical history adequately documented? Was treatment provided as ordered? Others specify thresholds that require appropriate treatment but leave it to professional judgment to decide
what constitutes appropriate treatment in each individual case. For
example, blood pressure above 140/9o requires intervention with a
normal patient; blood pressure above 13o/8o requires intervention with
a diabetic patient. The experts expect to integrate the audit process
with a "quality improvement" system of performance measures under
development for prisons generally. The system will specify indicators
for the classification of patients with various diagnoses by condition
("good," "fair," and "poor" control) in terms that will facilitate compari74
sons across prisons.
The Plata plan emphasizes flexibility. The defendants are free to
revise policies as long as they give notice to the plaintiffs (who are free
to challenge them in court). Treatment provided to individual inmates
will be deemed compliant if it is consistent with the department's policies or if "[t]he practitioner documents in the medical notes that he/she
is deviating from adopted policies and procedures and that such devia7' 5
tion is consistent with the community standard.
The agreement provides plaintiffs' counsel with extensive access to
information, including broad categories of documents, contact with
prisoners, oral interviews with staff, and periodic tours of the defendants' facilities. It also provides for mediation of disputes between the
parties.

74 Telephone Interview with Dr. Ronald Shansky, Consultant to the California Department of
Corrections (Oct. 15, 2002). An overview of the "quality improvement" approach reflected in the
settlement appears in Gordon Schiff & Ronald Shansky, Challenges of Improving Quality in the
Correctional Setting, in CLINICAL PRACTICE OF CORRECTIONAL MEDICINE 12, 12-2 5 (Michael Puisis ed., 1998).
75 Plata Stipulation, supra note 73, at ii.
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As presently structured, the relief in prison cases is less ambitious
than comparable interventions in mental health cases. So far, it has
not provided for monitoring institutions with stakeholder accountabil76
ity, such as the Quality Trust in the District of Columbia, that will
survive termination of the decree. Nor has it provided for general
public access to performance data in the manner of the Texas education reforms. Nevertheless, even at this early stage, its general thrust
seems to be in the spirit of the experimentalist approach, and this aspect is likely to grow in time.
The extent to which experimentalist development is constrained by
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 remains unclear. The Act is
intended to restrict intervention generally, but some of its provisions
could be interpreted to encourage movement in an experimentalist direction. Consider two of the most discussed provisions: the requirement that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit7 7
and the requirement that injunctive orders terminate after two years
unless the court makes a new finding that relief is still required to
remedy current violations.7 8 At least on its face, each provision seems
compatible with an ambitious regime of experimentalist intervention.
The exhaustion provision acknowledges that the administrator has
the presumptive responsibility for making the relevant determination.
From an experimentalist perspective, exhaustion contributes to the
goal of developing ongoing, autonomous capacity for learning and selfreform on the part of the prison. Some such principle would be essential to any experimentalist approach.
But an effective approach would have to provide safeguards against
the misuse of exhaustion to thwart serious review by, for example, establishing administrative routines that impose abusive delays or technical requirements on inmates. It would also have to provide for outside review of the prison's grievance procedures, both to resolve
individual disputes and to generate information useful for addressing
systemic problems.
We have a model for such an exhaustion requirement in the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 198o, which authorized the
Justice Department to initiate suits to vindicate the rights of prison
inmates and mental health patients. The exhaustion requirement in
this statute was specifically limited to "such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available" and only to procedures
that have been certified by the federal Attorney General as "in substantial compliance with minimum acceptable standards."7 9 In effect,
76 See supra pp. 1033-34.
77 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2ooo).

78 i8 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(i)(A)(i), (b)(3) (2000).
79 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(i)-(2) (Supp. IV 198o) (repealed 1996).
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the statute used the exhaustion defense as an inducement to prisons to
submit to a federal accreditation regime. Apparently, however, the inducement was insufficient. Among the Attorney General's certification
conditions was a requirement that inmates participate in the process of
developing and implementing the procedures. Few prisons sought certification, in substantial part because of their objection to the participation requirement.8 0
Although the exhaustion provision of the PLRA does not explicitly
require that internal procedures be adequate or certified, it would have
been plausible for the courts to imply an adequacy condition. For the
most part, however, they have declined to do so8 ' - in deference, we
suspect, less to any coherent interpretation of the statute than to the
visceral hostility to prisoners associated with its passage.
The second key provision of the PLRA - that injunctions terminate after two years unless there is proof of current violations - was
intended by its drafters and has been perceived by practitioners as a
major impediment to structural relief. It takes more than two years of
implementation to make major improvements in a prison with serious
violations. Moreover, the process of discovery and trial associated
with the initial establishment of violations is costly and timeconsuming. If this process must be repeated every two years, the costs
will be prohibitive.
But it is not clear that the termination provision will have such an
effect. To the extent that remedies take an experimentalist cast, there
should be no need for costly efforts to reestablish violations, for experimentalist remedies create transparency. Once liability is found, the
process of proof merges with that of implementation: a major focus of
implementation is the continuous measurement of compliance. The
parties should agree in the remedial negotiation on criteria and processes of measurement and on minimal performance thresholds. Measured performance below the agreed-upon threshold should suffice to
82
establish a violation.
80 See Adlerstein, supra note 65, at i686 & n.27.

81 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (20O1) (holding that a prisoner seeking only
money damages must exhaust nonmonetary administrative remedies); Boston, supra note 65, at
724-25 nn.74-76 (citing cases holding that the inadequacy of an administrative remedy does not
excuse failure to exhaust the remedy). Note that the consequence of failure to exhaust under the
PLRA is not, as under the Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act, a stay of the court action
pending the administrative proceeding, but rather a dismissal, even if an administrative remedy
is no longer available because the period for filing has passed. Id. at 726.
82 Some ambiguity about the space for experimentalist remediation arises from the requirements of the PLRA and federal equitable principles that the relief be the "least intrusive means
necessary" or "extend no further than necessary to correct" the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).
This precept could be interpreted to constrain experimentalist remedies, but it is also susceptible
to an interpretation that would encourage experimentalism. On one interpretation, the least intrusive injunction would attempt to spell out minimal compliance conditions in detail. In the
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In some respects, then, doctrine on prison reform reflects the shift
from command-and-control to experimentalist approaches.
On the
other hand, the doctrine is far less sympathetic to judicial intervention
of any kind than is comparable doctrine in the other areas we are considering.
D. Police Abuse
Acceptance of institutional reform litigation in policing has been
slower than in the other areas. There are both political and doctrinal
explanations for this phenomenon. The political explanation is that
popular fear of crime - and associated sentimentality about the police
- make judicial intervention seem costlier and riskier here.
The doctrinal explanation arises from the judicial perception that
police are less closely supervised and are in less continuous contact
with citizens than public servants in the other areas. This perception
had led to two procedural obstacles distinctive to the police context.
The first is a reluctance to infer systemic practices from discrete instances of misconduct. Chayes, for example, criticized the Supreme
Court's 1976 decision in Rizzo v. Goode. 3 The lower court, having
found nineteen specific incidents of unconstitutional police brutality,
issued an injunction requiring the police department to establish a
procedure for handling citizen complaints. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that nineteen proven episodes of street-level misconduct did not establish the necessary authorization or condonation to
84
find the department or its senior officials liable.
Another problem has been courts' insistence in many cases that a
plaintiff has standing only if she can show, not just that she has been
the victim of abuse, but that there is a high probability that she will be
85
abused again in the future.
Recently, however, two competing developments have widened the
possibilities for judicial intervention, and the initiatives encouraged by
both are, in their early stages, taking an experimentalist direction. The
first development occurred in 1994, when, in response to the Rodney
King case and the ensuing riots, Congress enacted a statute specifically
prohibiting any "pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement of-

competing view, an injunction - such as that in Plata - that mandated extensive restructuring
of background processes in order to leave agents more flexibility in dealing with individual cases
would be less intrusive.
In cases outside the prison context, as long as the parties agree on relief, there is no need for
the court to reach such issues. However, the issues are pressing under the PLRA, because the relief restrictions there apply to settlements as well as coercive decrees. i8 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(i).
83 Chayes, supra note i, at 13o5-o7; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
84 See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 367-69, 375-81.
85 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-10 (1983).
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ficers" that deprived people of federal rights. The statute authorizes
the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief "to eliminate the pattern
'8 6
or practice.
The Department of Justice has investigated several police forces
and has brought five lawsuits that have resulted in consent decrees
providing for extensive structural reforms. The reforms are considerably more elaborate than the decree reversed in Rizzo. The recent decrees vary in detail, depending in part on the preexisting organization
of the department in question, but they tend to have general elements
in common.
Typically, the defendant is obliged to promulgate or revise explicit
policies with respect to specified matters, such as the use of force.
Minimum substantive requirements are sometimes specified, but the
defendant retains broad discretion. Data collection efforts are prescribed, often in minute detail. The department must instruct officers
to document such matters as use-of-force incidents, arrests, traffic or
pedestrian stops, searches and seizures, and discretionary charges (such
as loitering or disturbing the peace). Officers must record the reason
for their intervention, the race and other characteristics of the citizens
involved, and what happened. Sometimes the decree requires videotaping. The departments sometimes agree to provide officers with
handheld computers or videorecorders. Officer-reported data must be
recorded and stored in a way that permits aggregation with other data,
such as citizen complaints (and compliments), disciplinary proceedings,
lawsuits, internal investigations, and audits. Other data on officer performance, such as sick days, missed court appearances, and accidents
may be added. Training for officers in the policies and the data collection procedures is prescribed. The Department of Justice may participate in designing the training or may have a right to sign off on it.87
The decrees also prescribe overlapping compliance procedures.
Line supervisors must monitor certain data and follow up on indications of policy violations. In addition, the department must install or
refine a specialized internal compliance unit outside the chain of command, such as an inspector general or an internal affairs bureau. Finally, the court appoints a monitor (ideally someone jointly recommended by the parties) with broad access to information. The monitor
oversees compliance as an agent of the court.

86 42 U.S.C. § I4,I4I(b)(2000).
87 See, e.g.,

ROBERT C.

DAVIS

ET AL.,

TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTS-

BURGH'S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 25-33 (Vera Inst. of Justice
2002), http://www.vera.org/publications/publications-5.asp?publication-id=18o;
Consent Decree,

United States v. City of Los Angeles, Civil No. oo-11769 GAF (C.D. Cal. June i5, 200l) [hereinafter Los Angeles Consent Decree], http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm.
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The decrees contemplate that the data will be used as an "Early
Warning System," providing indicators of systemic problems.,8 Use-offorce incidents are routinely investigated. So, too, are complaints by
citizens and other officers, whom the decree may oblige to report
wrongdoing by colleagues. In addition, the department is required to
perform various analyses of its data. For example, it must track the
frequency of use-of-force incidents, complaints, and discipline for individual officers. It analyzes use of force and other kinds of policecitizen interaction in relation to geographic area, race, shift, and squad.
Benchmarks or thresholds are developed based on statistical comparisons. A quarterly index of more than a standard deviation above the
mean of a prescribed comparison group (a squad or shift or set of
squads or shifts) might trigger a mandatory inquiry.
Line supervisors are obliged to follow up indications of noncompliance with nondisciplinary "interventions" that may include direct observation of the officer, counseling, or counseling combined with
additional training. Although the decrees emphasize nonpunitive responses, they also mandate discipline when necessary. Disciplinary
procedures must meet certain prerequisites. The threshold of proof for
a finding of misconduct cannot be higher than a preponderance of the
evidence, and there can be no presumption that police witnesses are
more credible than citizen ones. Charges and dispositions are to be periodically reported to senior officials and monitors.
The decrees also mandate procedures for "audits" by line managers
or internal compliance officials. Audits are designed both to determine
whether officer and supervisor conduct indicated in the records is consistent with stated policy and to test the integrity of the reporting
processes. For the latter purpose, auditors examine samples of documents for completeness and surface credibility (the routine use of
"canned" language is a negative signal). Smaller samples may be investigated more actively by interviewing participants, and "sting audits" with undercover monitors posing as citizens may be prescribed.8 9
Usually some of the data must be reported publicly. Audit reports
with overall observations on compliance and correlations of police interventions with race and locality are commonly disclosed, while information about specific incidents and officers typically is not.90

88 See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 821-41 ('999).
89 See, e.g., Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra note 87, at paras. 124-40.
90 See, e.g., id. at paras. 156, 174. A study of experience under the Pittsburgh consent decree,
though unable directly to assess effects on street-level conduct, found major effects on management practices and an improvement in public perceptions of the police. Supervisors monitor performance indicators and make interventions based on them daily. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 87,
at 10-33.
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The other development favoring police abuse litigation is the growing public awareness of and protest against racial profiling. 91 One of
the Justice Department lawsuits under the 1994 federal statute against New Jersey - focused on such claims. 92 Allegations of racial
profiling have also been the subject of private suits, and so far they
have not been blocked by the strict procedural doctrines of the earlier
police cases. Persistent unexplained statistical disparities in the racial
incidence of police actions can warrant an inference of institutional
condonation. Moreover, with activities such as traffic stops, the likelihood that a law-abiding minority person will suffer a repeated injury
93
is often demonstrably high enough to satisfy standing requirements.
There has been parallel legislative activity: at least thirteen states and
many local governments have enacted legislation prohibiting racial
94
profiling and requiring specific compliance procedures.
The progression from the Rizzo plaintiffs' concern with general
abuse to the current focus on racial targeting might seem the reverse of
the movement of the school cases from desegregation to "adequacy."
But relief in the current profiling cases seems more likely to resemble
relief in the school adequacy cases than the command-and-control injunctions of the desegregation cases. The approach agreed to in an
early private lawsuit against Montgomery County, Maryland, which
has emerged from the Justice Department's suit against New Jersey
and which has been widely mandated by state and local enactments,
focuses on monitoring rather than dictating ex ante the specifics of policing. The regimes commit the police not to use racial criteria (except
when they are seeking a previously identified suspect). The department must promulgate written criteria for stops and searches and then
document them in a way designed to permit assessment of whether the
conduct is consistent with its policy. The rules provide for analysis
and (sometimes public) reporting of the racial incidence of such stops
and searches. At least internally, the department should be able to
compare racial incidence by officer, squad, or region. The New Jersey
decree mandates the development of "benchmarks" - indicators based
on the racial correlations of the criteria used as triggers for stops, such
as vehicle type, driving behavior, and dress. The benchmarks are derived through analysis by social scientists of photographic records of
91 See generally Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 41 (2001); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, ioi MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002).
92 Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 99-5970 (MLL) (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
1999) [hereinafter New Jersey Consent Decree], www.state.nj.us/lps/jointapp.htm.
93 See Gross & Barnes, supra note 91, at 727-29; Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing While
Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1834-39

(2000).
94 Gross & Barnes, supra note 91, at 729.
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traffic flow. When police stop or search minorities at rates above the
benchmarks, an inference of racial profiling may arise, and interven95
tion is called for.
An important contested issue concerns the role of citizen groups in
these regimes. "Community policing," in which police devise local
crime control strategies in collaboration with neighborhood groups, is
now widely promoted. In various forms it has had promising trials in
several cities, including Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago. The Justice Department consent decrees, however, require police consultation
with community groups only in vague terms. Most importantly, they
do not require that the monitoring data they generate be made available to such groups. Critics assert that such groups have important information bearing on the interpretation of the data that is unlikely to
be available to professional monitors. These groups also arguably
have the strongest incentives to promote enforcement. Citizen groups
in Los Angeles and New Jersey have brought suits seeking expansion
of the relief in the consent decrees to afford broader access and par96
ticipation.
E. Housing
In housing, there has been a shift away from large-scale desegregation efforts toward regimes focused directly on housing quality that
parallels the course of school litigation from desegregation toward
"adequacy." Concomitantly, judicial efforts to address municipal discrimination against low-income housing development have evolved in
an experimentalist direction.
In 1969, in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, a federal district court found that the Authority, through siting and tenant assignment decisions, had unconstitutionally segregated the city's vast public
housing system. The court entered a broad decree, since revised many
times, to remedy the violations. The core of the decree was a mandate
that for every new unit the Authority built in a predominantly minority neighborhood, it had to build three units (later reduced to one) in a
nonminority neighborhood.97
More than thirty years later, plaintiffs and a receiver are still struggling to implement the decree. Only about seven percent of the units
constructed under the receiver are in white neighborhoods. Political
resistance in nonminority neighborhoods and the shift in federal hous95 See New Jersey Consent Decree, supra note 92, at 554-56; Garrett, supra note 91, at 76-8o;
Gross & Barnes, supra note 91, at 717-28;.
96 See Garrett, supra note 91, at 98-1'5; Livingston, supra note 88, at 841-56.
97 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 737-39 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Gautreaux v.
Landrieu, 498 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (N.D. Ill. i98o); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d
757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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ing support away from new public housing construction have stalled
further progress. As with schools, integration has become more difficult as whites have migrated out of the city. In addition, major problems in public housing quality persist. 98
Some civic and tenant groups have charged that the Gautreaux focus on integration has impeded rehabilitation of housing projects and
revitalization of minority neighborhoods. They further argue that the
integration effort has made housing development too expensive. In
two recent lawsuits, members of the Gautreaux class seeking to rehabilitate housing in minority neighborhoods have aligned themselves
against the Gautreaux receiver and plaintiffs' counsel. 99
There has been some success. Some units have been built in neighborhoods from which public housing was once excluded. A serviceintensive program that tries to help holders of "Section 8" housingassistance certificates find apartments in the suburbs appears to be
working. On the whole, however, the experience has been disappoint00
ing. 1
The landmark example of the shift of litigation focus to housing
quality is Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 10' in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an order placing the Housing Authority in receivership. The principal substantive basis of the
order was the state sanitary code requiring all landlords, public and
private, to maintain housing in minimally safe and habitable conditions.102 The plaintiffs presented voluminous evidence showing that
the Authority's projects were far from compliant. They also presented
evidence of corrupt and incompetent management, showing, for example, that the board and managers lacked skills and knowledge necessary to perform their duties, paid little attention to key aspects of their
98 See Joseph Seliga, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the Second Ghetto or Creating
the Third?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1049, io62 (2000).
99 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17439 (N.D. Il. Nov. 3, I999);
Cabrini-Green Local Advisory Council v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 625 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 22, 1997).
100 See generally Seliga, supra note 98; William P. Wilen & Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and
Chicago's Public Housing Crisis, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV 117 (2000).
Another notable large-scale desegregation case that took an enormous toll in terms of material expense and acrimony but generated disappointing results is United States v. Yonkers Board
of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For the depressing story in full, see Peter
H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REX. 289, 324-64 (2002).
101 400 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. i98o).
102 Another basis for structural relief recognized since Perez is "constructive demolition," a doctrine holding that extreme failure to maintain or repair can constitute violation of a statute requiring federally subsidized authorities to demolish only in accordance with a process involving HUD
approval. 42 U.S.C. § I437P (2000); see also Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Father Panik Vill. v.
Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D. Conn. 1988) (recognizing an implied cause of action for "de facto
demolitions" under the statute).
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jobs, allowed available resources to go unused, and ignored opportunities to apply for new resources.
The federal government has sought to establish a system for assessing public housing performance that supports public actions for structural relief. Pursuant to congressional mandate, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates the Public Housing Assessment System, which scores local agency performance according to a range of indicators in four general areas: (i) physical condition
(compliance with building and sanitation standards); (2) financial condition (for example, the number of months the authority can operate
on its Expendable Funds Balance without additional resources; the
average number of days tenant receivables are outstanding; the expense per unit of utilities, maintenance, and security; and the amount
of unobligated capital funds); (3)management operations (for example,
vacancy rates, number and age of outstanding work orders, and unit
turnaround time); and (4)resident service and satisfaction (based on
responses from a resident survey on issues such as maintenance and
repair, safety, management communication, recreation, and other services).
Each indicator is measured and then summed to produce
scores comparable across sites for each of the four areas and a total
score on a hundred-point scale. Authorities that receive scores of at
least sixty percent of the available points for physical condition, finance, and management and a total score above ninety are considered
"high performers" and are subject to relaxed reporting and monitoring
requirements. An authority with passing scores in each area and a total score between sixty and ninety is considered a "standard performer." These authorities are expected to formulate improvement
plans and to demonstrate progress under them. A failing score on
physical condition, finance, or management or a total score below sixty
leads to designation as "troubled" and subjects the authority to inten0 3
sive monitoring.
In an effort to make scores comparable across sites, HUD prescribes measurement procedures in minute detail. However, the system contemplates periodic revision in consultation with "owners, residents, and affected communities."'10 4 The tendency is toward a system

103 See Public Housing Assessment System, 24 C.F.R. pt. 902 (2003); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Public Housing Assessment System: Information About PHAS, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,i6o
(May 13, 1999).
104 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AUDIT
REPORT NO. 2ooi-DP-000 4 , at 15-17 (Sept. 28, 2oo), available at http://www.hud.govl
oig/igidoo04.pdf (reporting criticisms by HUD's Inspector General and the Government Accounting Office that the initial weights HUD assigned to physical condition indicators did not reflect
stakeholder priorities, and prescribing more effective consultation).
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of specific rules, but one that is continuously revised in light of its purposes through a participatory process.
In 199o, Congress directed HUD to petition a court to place in receivership housing authorities whose performances failed to improve
after being rated "troubled" under the assessment system.' 0 5 Reports
suggest that receivers have found their work difficult but have made
substantial improvements. 0 6 In principle, the receiver's goal is not
just to manage the property through a crisis, but to restructure its
processes in a way that makes effective operation possible without judicial intervention. As with reform of schools and mental health facilities, a major theme of many receiverships is decentralization. In housing, decentralization includes tenant participation, which has been a
prominent theme in federal public housing policy since the I98os.
HUD mandates resident advisory councils and encourages tenant
management of the projects it subsidizes. 0 7 Some receivers have had
notable success in strengthening these processes. 0 8
A final, convergent instance of judicial initiative involves private
housing development. It arose from the New Jersey Supreme Court's
1975 Mount Laurel decision.10 9 The court held that a local zoning ordinance that largely precluded low- and moderate-income housing violated a state constitutional provision granting various general rights
including the right "of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property."
It interpreted this provision to require a local government to structure
its zoning code so as to "make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing," including its "fair share of the present and
prospective regional need" for low- and moderate-income housing." I0
This holding is a housing analogue to the recognition by state supreme
courts of the right to an adequate education.
Mount Laurel differs procedurally from the other cases considered
here. The New Jersey court was not dealing with one or a few institutions in a single case with a single structural decree. It was attempting
to deal with practices of local governments across the state, and it
acted in a series of cases, each involving a single locality. Yet its goals

105 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j) (2ooo).
106 See MARK H. MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN
GOVERNMENT 193-200, 240-55 (1995) (Boston); Lynn E. Cunningham, Washington D.C.'s Successful Public Housing Receivership, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. 74
(1999); Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke, Innovation or Illegitimacy: Remedial Receivership in Tinsley v.
Kemp Public Housing Litigation, 65 MO. L. REV 655 (2000) (Kansas City).
107 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV, COMMUNITY BUILDING IN PUBLIC
HOUSING: TIES THAT BIND PEOPLE AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1997).
108 See MOORE, supra note lo6, at 250-53; Luedtke, supra note io6, at 672.
109 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
110 Id. at 724.
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were structural and its practices managerial in ways strongly analogous to those in the other new public law cases.
The first Mount Laurel opinion simply announced the new doctrine
in general terms and struck down the particular ordinance in question,
leaving development of the doctrine to future cases. The case encouraged the civil rights groups that had brought it and mobilized developers. Many municipalities resisted strongly. A movement to amend the
state constitution to eliminate the doctrine formed but never succeeded.
In 1983 the court issued an opinion reaffirming its commitment to
the doctrine and further guiding its implementation. Mount Laurel II
did not prescribe comprehensive or specific directives for the determination of a locality's "fair share." Instead, it incorporated the methodology of a "Development Guide" promulgated by a state agency. The
court prescribed that judges would be guided by the agency's revisions
of the methodology. It provided an illustrative list of ways in which a
municipality might satisfy its duties, including density bonuses and inclusionary zoning. It also prescribed a "builder's remedy," by which a
builder who prevailed on a Mount Laurel challenge to a zoning ordinance would be permitted to build unless the municipality could show
that the project violated some valid regulation. This obviated the possibility that, when a locality lost a Mount Laurel challenge, all development would cease until it came up with a valid zoning code. This
remedy also gave developers strong incentives to challenge noncompliant codes. Finally, the court established a procedure by which it
would appoint lower court judges to hear Mount Laurel zoning appeals. It would designate three judges to hear all the appeals statewide, one judge for each of three regions. M
This arrangement made possible a complex series of negotiations
among municipalities and across cases that produced considerable
agreement on the assignment of responsibility. When the Urban
League sued twenty-three municipalities, one of the Mount Laurel
judges ordered the planning experts of all the parties to meet to negotiate a formula for allocating "fair shares" of new affordable housing.
The effort produced a consensus that became the basis for subsequent
1 2
allocation decisions throughout the state.
In 1985, the legislature responded to the Mount Laurel decisions
with the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, establishing an administrative
agency, the Council on Affordable Housing, to assume the primary role
in monitoring compliance with Mount Laurel obligations. The statute
Ill See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 422-513
(N.J. 1983).
112

See

CHARLES M.

JUDGES 57 (1996).

HAAR, SUBURBS
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also charged the Council with providing research and technical support and facilitating negotiations among local governments. Although
the statute and the Council's activities have retreated from some aspects of Mount Laurel, much of the framework established by the
11 3
courts has been preserved.
Although opinion is divided, Mount Laurel can plausibly be viewed
as a "marginal success."' 14 The efforts it prompted do not appear to
have led to integration of the suburbs, but they have increased the
supply of low- and moderate-income housing in New Jersey. 1 15 Moreover, the court prompted the legislature to create an administrative
process that seems significantly more responsive to the interests articulated by the plaintiffs, both by creating pressures for local accommodation of low-income housing and by making the zoning process more
transparent. A few other state courts have followed Mount Laurel's
lead in finding state constitutional restraints on exclusionary zoning,
though generally in a weaker form, and several state legislatures have
instituted statutory schemes resembling the New Jersey Fair Housing
16
Act, with and without judicial prompting. 1
E. Conclusion
In all of these areas, though to varying degrees, there has been a
tendency for remedial practice to move away from command-andcontrol toward experimentalist methods.
It is possible that this tendency has partly been a function of
changes in substantive issues. For example, in prison litigation, many
cases in the 197OS and I98os focused on crowding. Today's cases more
commonly focus on inmate medical care. It is much easier to formulate specific directives for crowding than for medical care.

113 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5 2:27D- 3 02(c) (West 2001).

See generally HAAR, supra note 112, at

89-116.
114 Henry Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
I, 72 (2001). Haar views it as more than marginally successful. See generally HAAR, supra note
112. But there are negative assessments. See Schuck, supra note ioo, at 315-i9. The authors of
DAVID KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA

0995),

view the judicial regime created by Mount Laurel II as highly promising and the results of the
administrative regime that replaced it as meager. See id. at I12-64.
115 Based on Commission on Affordable Housing data, Span estimates that from 1987 to 2oo1
the Mount Laurel-inspiredstatutory regime added 40,000 units of affordable housing and perhaps
a larger number of market-rate middle-income units that otherwise would not have been built.
Span, supra note 154, at 65-68.
116 See id. at 37-84. Span views Oregon, where a judicial decision was also followed by a legislative response, as the most successful case: "[T]he Oregon experience shows that if a court can
manage to provoke a state legislature into creating a state agency with jurisdiction over land-use
and housing policy, such an agency can go further than its original mandate if given significant
interest group, as well as judicial, support." Id. at 72-73.
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To some extent, however, the move reflects a general sense of the
inadequacy of command-and-control approaches. Courts found they
lacked both the information and the depth and range of control to
properly formulate and enforce command-and-control injunctions.
Moreover, command-and-control interventions exacerbated resistance
on the part of defendants - or at least, top-down measures had little
capacity to neutralize such resistance.
Any assessment of the comparative efficacy of the two approaches
would have to be tentative and qualified. In general, where clearly
bad practices (and the available bad substitutes for them) can be specifically described and are not too numerous, a negative injunction in
specific mandatory terms will often seem promising. Thus, the courts
desegregated many countywide school districts in the rural South with
more or less command-and-control-style decrees. The early prison
cases made substantial improvements with traditional top-down prohibitions of practices such as convict-leasing and torture.
Even where the conditions for command-and-control intervention
are not satisfied, experimentalist approaches will not always be promising. Jennifer Hochschild argues that the most successful Northern
school desegregation cases, such as that of Wilmington, Delaware,
were those in which the courts mandated practices specifically and
quickly. She contends that in cases such as Boston's, the emphasis on
stakeholder participation impeded progress.1" 7
Nevertheless, the new approaches are promising in many contexts.
In the following Part, we suggest some reasons why they might succeed where the older ones have failed.
III. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AS DESTABILIZATION RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT

A. Right and Remedy
The feature of Chayesian public law litigation that has most troubled legal analysis is the relation of right and remedy. Determination
of right, or liability, looks familiar. Normatively, it seems like a judgment about entitlement of a sort courts customarily make. Methodol-

117

See

JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEM-

OCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 92-145 (1984).

It may be, however, that the success
stories Hochschild emphasizes depended on stakeholder participation mobilized after the formulation of the remedy as part of its implementation. And the most important explanation for the
failure of cases like Boston's may be that remedies there were confined to a single urban district,
rather than, as in Wilmington, operating across several.
See JEFFREY A. RAFFEL, THE
POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE METROPOLITAN
120-53, 208-17 (i980).
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ogically, it seems to arise from the application of conventional legal
analysis to traditional sources.
But as Chayes emphasized, the remedial implications of a public
law determination of right are more ambiguous than those of the
paradigmatic private law determination. A judgment of tort or contract liability usually implies a limited range of specific interventions. 1 8 A public law liability determination speaks with some clarity
only about the broadest goals of intervention. It has only vague implications for the specific forms intervention should take. Moreover, remedial design requires a different type of decisionmaking from rights
determination. It does not directly involve the elaboration of normative principles or the interpretation of texts. Remedial design involves
more technical, strategic, and contextual forms of thought.
Drawn from a practice that was more transitional than he anticipated, Chayes's formulation of the public law relation between right
and remedy was inconclusive. It invited two contrary, symmetrically
unsatisfactory interpretations. Daryl Levinson calls the first of these
"rights essentialism."''1 9 This view sees liability determination as the
core judicial function and remedial formulation as derivative and secondary. The declaration of substantive rights draws its legitimacy directly from the role of the courts in elaborating and protecting entitlements. Prescribing remedies is an ancillary activity necessary to give
practical effect to the liability judgment but less grounded in legal
principle.
The evolution of public law traced in Part II suggests important
objections to this view. To portray the core of judging as the declaration of rights independent of the effort to actualize them in particular
circumstances ignores the practical dimension of adjudication. It also
misrepresents the psychology of judicial decisionmaking to suggest
that the anticipated difficulties of implementing rights do not strongly
influence their declaration. Furthermore, if Holmes's "bad man," who
cares only about tangible sanctions and rewards, 120 captures any
dimension of social life, then the remedy will determine the impact of
the case on future conduct. 2 '

118See

Chayes, supra note i, at 1282-83. Nonetheless, the difference can be exaggerated.

Some of the classics of modern legal scholarship have been devoted to showing that the remedial
implications of private law rights are not as definite as people sometimes think. See, e.g., Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV io89 0972); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
119 Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLuM. L. REV 857,
858 (1999).
120 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, io HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
121 See generally Levinson, supra note i rg.
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The contrary view insists, with Holmes's "bad man," that only the
remedy is important. But this crude positivism is even less satisfactory
than the exaltation of rights. It ignores that the remedy arises from a
reflective effort to give meaning to the right. Both rights essentialism
and crude positivism understate the interdependence of rights declaration and remedial formulation. The remedy is an elaboration of the
rights in question: it is not a technical effort to execute an already defined norm, as rights essentialism implies; nor is it an exercise of instrumental discretion, as crude positivism suggests.
Moreover, neither perspective captures the two most important distinctions between the two phases of decisionmaking in the new public
law. First, the move to the remedial phase in experimentalist cases
will often involve a shift in process, personnel, and methodology. The
judge's role changes from that of directly determining the merits to facilitating a process of deliberation and negotiation among the stakeholders. The judge's determination in the liability phase can take into
account the anticipated results of this process only to a small extent,
because the same limitations of the judge's knowledge that force him
to initiate the process also constrain his ability to anticipate its resuits.

12 2

Second, the incentive or deterrent effect on potential future defendants does not depend on the specifics of the remedy in any particular
case. Unlike the social engineer trying to regulate the Holmesian "bad
man," the experimentalist lawmaker does not try to calibrate remedies
precisely to induce the desired pattern of conduct, because she does not
know with any specificity what the desired pattern of conduct is. The
message that the new public law sends to prospective defendants is not
that they will suffer any specific set of consequences in the event of default, but that they will suffer loss of independence and increased uncertainty. Uncertainty does not represent a failure of articulation but
the deliberate crux of the message.
A critical aspect of both the declaratory and the remedial dimension of the new public law litigation is captured in Roberto Mangabeira Unger's notion of "destabilization rights." This idea is part of
the detailed institutional program of "empowered democracy" that
concludes Unger's L987 work, False Necessity: "Destabilization rights
protect the citizen's interest in breaking open the large-scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the
destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated
'2 3
hierarchies of power and advantage.'
122 When the defendant concedes liability in negotiation, the shift from liability to remedy is
less marked. There may be little change in process or personnel, but there is likely to be a change
in perspective and methodology.
123 UNGER, supra note 13, at 530.
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Destabilization induces the institution to reform itself in a process
in which it must respond to previously excluded stakeholders. Although Unger describes the idea only briefly, he gives Chayesian public law litigation as an illustration. We think the practice in public law
cases in the years since Unger's book appeared might be considered
both a vindication and an elaboration of his idea.
Destabilization usefully describes both the remedy and the process
by which the meaning of the background substantive right is articulated in these cases. In the new public law, the judge does not exercise
discretion in each case to choose among an infinite array of potential
responses to the particular problem. Rather, having found a violation
of some broad norm - the right to an adequate education, the right to
access to justice - she imposes the single remedy that the liability
phase has shown to be appropriate: institutional destabilization. This
remedy has a common structure across fields. Moreover, judicially
and publicly accountable standard-setting in the experimentalist liability phase bridges the gulf between the initial affirmation of the substantive right and the eventual remedy.
In the remainder of this Part, we elaborate on the understanding of
the new public law as destabilization rights. We start by noting precedent for destabilization rights in traditional private law. Here we suggest that Chayes's distinction between "traditional" and "public" law
obscures an important feature of the former that foreshadows the experimentalist version of the latter. We then describe public law rights
and remedies as forms of deliberate, reflective destabilization. Experimentalist intervention is a public institutional analogue of the ongoing destabilization induced by common law norms in the private
market. Such intervention subverts entrenchment by subjecting institutions both to ongoing scrutiny by their stakeholders and to the feedback of disciplined performance comparisons with peer institutions.
The inauguration of these experimentalist regimes is preceded by
remedial negotiations. These negotiations are induced and fueled by
an intense destabilization that results from the initial intervention of
the court. The parties define the remedies, but it seems unlikely that
they could do so without this intervention. The court's principal contribution is to indicate publicly that the status quo is illegitimate and
cannot continue. We show that this very general intervention can
have a series of effects that may make it possible for the adversaries to
collaborate productively to design a specific remedial regime.
B. The Destabilization Theme in Private Law Litigation
Chayes's article built on a contrast between the "traditional model"
of private litigation and actions against public officials for structural
injunctive relief. He characterized traditional litigation as "bipolar"
(affecting only two parties), retrospective (concerned with past facts),
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involving claims of right that implied definite remedies proportional to
the harm alleged, "self-contained" (in the sense that judgment terminated the court's involvement), and "party-controlled" (implying a pas12 4
sive judicial role).
But even when it operates primarily as a mechanism of dispute
resolution, the common law has precedential effects that ramify beyond individual cases and shape the backdrop of general rules that
regulate social interaction. In areas such as tort and bankruptcy,
moreover, the common law is intended to operate as much as a system
of social regulation as one of dispute resolution. By ignoring the way
the systemic and self-consciously regulatory aspects of traditional adjudication entailed polycentricity and destabilization, Chayes exaggerated the novelty of public law litigation.
To be sure, the continuity with traditional litigation was far less salient in the command-and-control practices that prevailed when he
wrote. But this continuity has become more visible in the experimentalist practice of recent years. The tendency of the common law to destabilize congealed social practices anticipates a central theme of experimentalist public law.
i.

Precedent and Polycentricity. -

Common law adjudication

produces both a resolution of the dispute between the parties and a
norm -

the precedent -

that is supposed to guide future cases and,

by implication, social conduct. Chayes acknowledged the doctrine of
precedent but associated it principally with appellate courts. He portrayed trial courts as concerned with factfinding and noted that this
".function was characteristically remitted to the "black box" of jury determination. 12 Because juries do not explain their verdicts, their decisions are ambiguous and have little formal precedential effect.
But juries decide cases under instructions from judges about the
law; judges can make rulings that keep cases from juries or overrule
their decisions, and they also make many decisions that influence the
issues and evidence that go to the jury. All these decisions are formally subject to stare decisis. A trial court decision is binding on subordinate tribunals, if any exist, and on the court itself in future cases;
further, it is persuasive authority for courts in other jurisdictions.
Most trial court decisions are not officially published, but they are often published online and reported in the press and through informal
channels. As a practical matter, we know that many trial court rulings
and jury verdicts do influence conduct, as indications of the likely behavior of courts in future cases. 12 6 And, of course, appellate cases start
124 Chayes, supra note i, at 1282-83.

See id. at 1285-88.
See generally, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge,26 LAW & SoC'y REV. 47 (1992).
125

126

1o58

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:1015

out as lower court cases, and their outcomes are often strongly influenced by conduct in the lower court both in making legal rulings and
in the framing of the record.
In their precedential dimension, then, trial court decisions in traditional common law cases share characteristics Chayes attributed to
public law litigation. They have effects that extend beyond the immediate parties. Institutional litigants show their awareness of this when
they coordinate trial strategies with each other or monitor cases in
which they are not directly involved. Judges, in making common law
decisions, often try to take account of their precedential effects. These
future effects are not necessarily proportional to or predictable from
the particular harm alleged by the plaintiff before the court. To the
extent that the case creates precedent, the lawsuit is not "selfcontained"; the court will revisit the precedent in future cases. In applying and elaborating precedent, the court looks to its own past decisions and those of other courts, not just to the record created by the
parties before it.
Finally, the precedential aspect of common law decisions blurs the
distinction between simple or self-contained and complex or ramifying
problems that is so prominent in the literature on public law litigation. 1 27 Chayes associated private law litigation with self-contained
disputes and public law litigation with what Lon Fuller called "polycentric" problems.' 28 Fuller's metaphor for the polycentric problem
was the spider's web: tugging at one point on a single strand produces
movement that ripples throughout the entire web. Adjudication, he
suggested, was most appropriate for localized, self-contained problems.
When the effects of resolving a particular dispute ramify broadly, he
suggested, adjudication was not well-suited. A key example mentioned by Fuller and taken up by later commentators is the allocation
of resources under a fixed budget. 1 2 9 A decision to increase funding
for a particular activity requires that resources be directed away from
others (and perhaps also toward others, to the extent that the new
commitment requires complementary expenditures for example,
more spending on police may require more spending on courts and
prisons). Public law litigation proponents point to problems courts
routinely handle that seem polycentric, such as probate 30 and divorce.

127 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 135-36 (Thomas, J., concurring) (1995); Fletcher,
supra note 7, at 645-50.
128 See Chayes, supra note i, at 1304 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,
years
129
130

92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395-98 (1978)). Fuller's article circulated in manuscript for many
before it was published, and Chayes cited this version. See id. at 1304 n.94.
See Fuller, supra note 128, at 394-96.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin In-

stitutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 479-86, 488-93 (i98o).
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Moreover, every judicial order implies an allocation of public funds
sufficient to enforce it; the enforcement costs of even routine private
litigation are often substantial, and enforcement often depends on the
discretionary initiative of public officials, such as sheriffs charged with
finding and executing on a defendant's assets.
If we focus on the precedential aspects of common law adjudication, we see a further striking respect in which the most traditional
private law adjudication is polycentric. Whatever the direct mandatory effects of a common law decision, its precedential effects often
ramify in myriad and partly unforeseeable ways. 131 A negligence case,
for example, will often set a standard that raises the costs of a practice
or product - costs that may or may not be passed on to customers.
Satisfying the standard may increase or decrease the demand by the
producer for other goods or services. The modification of the producer's conduct or product may either increase or decrease its attractiveness to consumers relative to other goods. The modification may
induce technological developments providing benefits that spill over to
other products, or alternatively, the decision may encourage technological stagnation. Yet the court typically must decide on the basis of
only a small fraction of the relevant information. That such doctrines
can have very large but uncertain effects is a pervasive premise of contemporary legal thought. 3 2 This premise is prominent, for example, in
the contemporary debate over tort liability. Although they do not
agree on what the effects of tort liability are, most of the commentators
assume they are large, and even those who regard the effects as unfortunate view them as objections to particular doctrines 133 rather than as
reasons why courts are not qualified to adjudicate those kinds of cases.
2. The DestabilizationAspect of Common Law Regulation. - Joseph Schumpeter coined the phrase "creative destruction" to emphasize
that the market processes that generate economic development depend
on frequent and often abrupt institutional subversion and redeploy-

131 See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV 1, 39-44 (1979) (suggesting that all judicial norm declaration is polycentric).

Although he associated traditional common law adjudication with unicentric problems,
Fuller acknowledged that precedent gave it a polycentric dimension. See Fuller, supra note 128,
at 398. He did not elaborate on this insight, however, except to speculate in passing that the fact
that precedential norms were developed flexibly and gradually might make them adaptable to
polycentric problems. Most public law critics who built on the polycentricity idea ignored this
qualification.
132 Two prominent histories attribute large social effects to the nineteenth-century common law.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-186o (1977); J.
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND

THE CONDITIONS

OF FREEDOM

IN THE

NINETEENTH-

CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).

133 See, e.g., PETER V. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-18 (1988).
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ment. 134 Common law norms play an important role in this process.
Consider two especially important examples from tort law - the duty
of care to strangers and the immunity for competitive injury.
The duty of care holds industries responsible, usually through
damages, for the consequences of socially unreasonable practices.
Reasonableness is measured in both efficiency and fairness terms.
While industry custom is often used as a proxy for both efficiency and
fairness, it is not a trump; even longstanding and universal practices
are sometimes found unreasonable. 135 When a common law court enforces prevailing industry standards, it puts pressure on weaker, less
adept firms. Some will improve their practices; some will go out of
business. When a court raises standards for the industry, it puts pressure on all firms. The reasonableness norm is continuously revisable;
it is elaborated in the context of current social circumstances. So firms
can rarely sit back, confident that today's practices will be sufficient.
They are likely to experience some pressure to improve.
The competitive injury norm is the opposite of a liability norm it presumptively shields those who compete successfully through price
or product quality from claims by unsuccessful producers injured by
their activities. 136 This norm subjects economic actors to pervasive
vulnerability and potentially devastating loss and thus promotes improved performance. As with the duty of care, the immunity for competitive injury creates pressures for continuous adjustment, and it often causes disruption and loss.
Common law norms like the duty of care and the immunity for
competitive injury regulate indirectly and partially. Sometimes, however, common law courts engage in more direct and comprehensive restructuring of business institutions. Two areas are especially important
- antitrust and insolvency.
Antitrust is a set of tools designed to destabilize enterprises that
have reduced their vulnerability to competitive pressures. In effect,
the doctrine forces enterprises to remain open to these pressures.
Sometimes damages and the prohibition of specific practices are
deemed sufficient for enforcement. At other times, when an enterprise
or group has acquired monopoly or oligopoly power, courts are obliged
to undertake direct and comprehensive restructuring. Over the years,
major portions of the oil, tobacco, cement, and movie industries,

134 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3 d ed.
I950).

135 See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 6o F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
136 The norm became firmly established only in the nineteenth century. Prior to that time, established enterprises in many lines of business could sometimes recover from successful competitors for "loss of custom." See HORWITZ, supra note 132, at 14-I6.
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among others, have been restructured by court decree under antitrust
laws. 137
Insolvency is another area in which courts undertake direct and
comprehensive reorganization. Chayes noted in passing that "[f]rom
1870 to 1933, federal judges, acting through equitable receivers, reorganized over i,ooo railroads," but he considered this activity outside
the core work of common law courts. 138 Much of this reorganization
work is concentrated in the federal bankruptcy courts. Nevertheless,
state courts of general jurisdiction have substantial power to restructure organizations in situations where there is insolvency or a risk of
insolvency. Insolvency law has aspects of both restabilization and destabilization. One of its principal purposes is to protect enterprises
against the excessively destabilizing pressures that can result when
creditors assert their claims individually without coordination. The
resulting scramble risks both a disorderly distribution and the destruction of potentially viable enterprises. Insolvency law mitigates the destructive destabilizing effects of the common law of contract. In another dimension, however, insolvency law destabilizes: it disentrenches
the position that the owners or managers of the debtor might otherwise have. Once the race to judgment is halted by public intervention
or agreement among the creditors, the debtor has some advantages. It
has the best information about the condition and prospects of the
business, and it can coordinate its strategy without the difficulties that
a diverse creditor coalition faces. Other aspects of the insolvency
process are thus designed to level the field by forcing the debtor to disthe extreme,
close information, assisting creditor coordination, and at 139
mandating displacement of the debtor or its management.
On a more general level, the destabilization theme is reflected in
two pervasive characteristics of common law norms. First, a common
law precedent, in its paradigmatic form as a damage judgment, regulates indirectly. It indicates that those in the position of the defendant
will have to pay damages for comparable future injuries, but it does
not specifically dictate conduct. In many cases, it leaves the defendant
free to choose between compensating future victims and reducing
harm, as well as free to decide how to reduce future harm. Second, a
common law norm is open-textured and open-ended. It is opentextured in the sense that it states a principle rather than a rigid or
specific rule, and the principle is embedded in a set of facts. Its future
137 See generally Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It Has Been,
Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'VY 239
(1999)138 Chayes, supra note i, at 1303 n.92.
139 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19, 1932o8 (1986).
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applicability has to be determined through informal, analogical reasoning. A common law norm is open-ended in the sense that it is always
open to revision, modification, and elaboration. Whether this process
is portrayed as a quest to delineate a timeless but amorphous principle
or as a process of continuous regulatory adjustment, common law
norms have a provisional quality.
Chayes ignored these destabilizing, regulatory aspects of common
law for two related reasons. First, as we noted, he saw the common
law largely as a dispute-resolution mechanism that resolved cases one
by one without disturbing the settled practices of the market. Second,
he associated effective regulation in the age of the administrative state
with the command-and-control model of a comprehensive set of fixed
and rigid rules. Public law adjudication in his conception was primarily an innovation in the process of rulemaking, not in the kind of rules
made. Thus, he was doubly indisposed to detect the regulatory current of "traditional" law.
But the evolution of public law itself demonstrates the limitations
of this perspective. The trend in structural remedies, we have seen, is
away from command-and-control toward initiatives that build on and
even systematize the very qualities of indirection and provisionality
characteristic of common law norms.
C. DestabilizationRights
A public law destabilization right is a right to disentrench or unsettle a public institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum
standards of adequate performance and, second, it is substantially
immune from conventional political mechanisms of correction. In the
typical pattern of the new public law suit, a finding or concession of
liability triggers a process of supervised negotiation and deliberation
among the parties and other stakeholders. The characteristic result
of this process is a regime of rolling or provisional rules that are periodically revised in light of transparent evaluations of their implementation.
i. The Prima Facie Case. - The prima facie case for public law
destabilization has two elements: failure to meet standards and political blockage. The first element is explicit and is the focus of evidence
and argument in the liability phase. The second is less discussed but
remains an important background premise.
The determination regarding compliance with minimum standards
is the least controversial aspect of institutional reform adjudication.
Often the plaintiff's claim that the institution fails to meet minimum
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standards is uncontested.1 40 Often, operating managers are sympathetic to, and even supportive of, the claims because they themselves
have been struggling to bring the institutions into compliance. Even
senior public officials, including governors and mayors, are sometimes
willing to concede the point, especially when they can blame prior administrations. Thus, the Dukakis administration, explicitly declining
to defend the "indefensible," conceded that Massachusetts's mental
health facilities failed to meet minimum standards, and the Williams
administration in the District of Columbia conceded that the District's
facilities for mentally retarded persons were unacceptable. Arkansas's
prison administrator encouraged a federal court challenge to the institutions he ran and cooperated with the plaintiffs and the court. In the
Texas prison litigation, a lawyer for the Texas corrections department
informed the state attorney general that conditions in its facilities were
in some respects worse than the plaintiffs alleged. In the Kansas City
desegregation case, the school district initially joined the parents as a
plaintiff against the state and was only later realigned by the court as
a defendant. In Pittsburgh, a new police chief embraced monitoring
procedures sought by the Department of Justice in the course of distancing himself from the mixed reputation of the prior administra41
tion.1
To the extent liability is disputed, the court's role is virtually identical to its role in traditional tort litigation. In effect, the court looks to
industry standards to define minimum performance. Standards are
proved through expert testimony about customary practice by experienced practitioners or academics and through judicial notice of norms
promulgated by accrediting or standard-setting organizations within
the relevant field. In education, the courts look to student performance on standardized tests, to teacher qualifications in relation to standards of accrediting organizations, and to school facilities under standards promulgated by accrediting organizations. In prison cases,
standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association and
the Federal Bureau of Prisons have played a critical role. National
standards regarding police conduct emerged only recently, but the
140 The frequency of agreement between the parties on both liability and remedy is emphasized
in SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at i22; Rebell, supra note 41, at go; and Margo
Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MIcH. L.
REV. 1994, 2012-13 (I999).
141 See Ricci v. Okin, 537 F. Supp. 817, 820-2i (D. Mass. 1982) (noting the Dukakis administration's acknowledgement of "indefensible" conditions); Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d 79, 9697 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that officials had stipulated that "[t]he District government has fundamentally failed its obligation to disabled persons" but had insisted that the failure had occurred
under prior administrations); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6, at 59-63 (Arkansas); id. at 88-89
(Texas); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (I99o) (Kansas City); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 87, at
7 (Pittsburgh).
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Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies now
plays a significant role. Courts in public housing litigation look to
HUD's performance assessment system, as well as to the Uniform
Housing Code promulgated by the International Conference of Building Officials. Sometimes these standards have been incorporated explicitly into the laws on which plaintiffs' claims are based, as with
housing code standards in some public housing cases. More often,
courts have to determine the standards' relevance to general constitutional or statutory norms. Although disputes over specifics are common, the principle of using such standards in interpreting the general
norms has been largely uncontroversial.
The second element of the prima facie case - immunity to political
correction - is distinctive to the public law arena. 14 2 The traditional
common law process operates in an environment of market competition. When private actors immunize themselves from competition, antitrust law may intervene. By contrast, government institutions tend
to be monopolistic. Their principal accountability mechanisms tend to
be electoral and political. Public law norms play a role analogous to
antitrust law in disrupting institutions that have become steeled to po1

litical pressures.

43

The political element of the prima facie case is generally not explicit, but it seems an important premise of most cases. Three patterns
recur. The first involves majoritarian political control unresponsive to
the interests of a vulnerable, stigmatized minority. 144 The minority
can be a racial group, as in some versions of the education, housing,
and police cases. Or it can be a group that has been socially stigmatized on the basis of conduct or disposition, as with prisoners and mental health patients.
Some cases seem to fit a second pattern - the "logic of collective
action" - in which a concentrated group with large stakes exploits or
disregards a more numerous but more diffuse group with collectively
larger but individually smaller stakes. 145 Chayes emphasized this pattern. He saw institutional reform as comparable to then-recent admin142 Because we reject the idea that courts are uniquely, or even - by themselves - adequately,
qualified to elaborate public law rights, we disagree with Owen Fiss's claim that the courts' traditional law-declaring function is a sufficient basis for public law litigation in the absence of political failure. See Fiss, supra note 131, at 6-13.
As we indicate above, in most cases finding egregious performance failure, some form of
political failure is also evident. But there are exceptions in which the political process seems adequate to address performance failures and the court should stay its hand. See, e.g., Marisol A. ex
rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussed infra note 222).
143 John Hart Ely's phrase "[c]learing the [cihannels of [p]olitical [cihange" seems pertinent
here, though he applies it to the narrower function of policing the electoral process. See JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-34 (198o).
144 See generally id.
145 See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (i965).
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istrative law developments influenced by the notion that regulatory
agencies were susceptible to "capture" by the industries they regulated,
at the expense of more dispersed groups of consumers (in the case of
price regulation) or local residents (in the case of environmental regulation).1 46 The courts responded to such concerns by increasing the access of resident, consumer, or citizen group representatives to the administrative process and heightening agency accountability to such
groups. 47 In public law litigation, the most common concerns about
"capture" centered on public employees. At the upper tiers, public
housing or prison officials might exploit their control of public institutions to do favors for friends and supporters or even to turn a profit.
At the lower tiers, patrol-level police officers or mental health custodians might take personal satisfaction from abusing their power over
citizens or inmates, or they might simply shirk.
And in all the areas, one can also see a third pattern overlapping
one or both of the other two - the prisoner's dilemma, in which
groups are caught in a low-level equilibrium that is susceptible to generally beneficial improvement, but only through a kind of coordination
that existing institutions are inadequate to induce.1 4
The minority
oppression and "capture" views do not explain the great discretion that
defendants often retain in the remedial phase. How can it be, Colin
Diver asks, that the defendant, after being found to have systematically and pervasively violated the rights of the plaintiffs, is permitted
to take the leading role in designing and implementing the remedy for
its own wrongs? 149 Of course, the defendant is not always allowed
such a role. Some restrictions on and adjustments to its authority invariably follow a finding of liability, and at the limit - when the court
opts for receivership - the defendant may be displaced or restructured. But Diver's question is surely pertinent in the many cases in
which the court leaves the defendant to play a dominant role.
Part of the answer lies in the fact noted earlier that defendants, or
important constituents within the defendant institutions, are often
sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claims. Even more often, defendants
welcome the new resources that the decree induces nonparty governmental and private sources to volunteer. In many cases, the federal
government has withheld funds because of the same derelictions of
which the plaintiffs complain. The remedy makes these resources

146 See Chayes, supra note i, at 1310.
147 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV 1667, 1723-57 (1975).
148 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
149 See Diver, supra note 2, at 82-83.
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Universities and civic organizations also sometimes make

50
major resource commitments to educational reform decrees.1
In principle, the defendants could negotiate such arrangements on
their own without lawsuits. It is possible that they are not inclined to
do so, but it is also possible that they face major coordination obstacles
to doing so. Local executive agencies may be limited in their ability to
provide the kind of credible assurances that would make the federal
government and nongovernmental organizations feel comfortable extending new resources to them.
There is some analogy here to the role of the bankruptcy court or
the equitable receiver in business insolvency. Part of the role of the
court is to resolve coordination problems among the various stakeholders in the enterprise. Left to act as individuals, the stakeholders
would behave in collectively destructive ways. Those in control of the
organization would squander its assets rapidly in the expectation of being displaced.
Anticipating this, each outside stakeholder would
scramble to grab what she could before everything was gone. The resulting distribution would be arbitrary and would destroy any goingconcern value of the enterprise. The court's intervention facilitates
stakeholder coordination. The court organizes a process in which the
stakeholders scale back their claims to permit fair distribution and, if
the enterprise has ongoing value, its continuation. When the enterprise is viable, this process makes it possible to attract new investment.
The process also allows for replacement or supervision of management
15
by or on behalf of the stakeholders. ,
This second element of the prima facie case - political blockage
- sometimes becomes salient in later phases of a case in which the
court assesses the adequacy of an administrative or legislative response
to an initial declaration of liability. For example, both the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mount Laurel and the Texas Supreme Court in
Edgewood eventually sustained legislative settlements of the issues in
these cases. 152 No doubt there was substantial political pressure for
the courts to do so (though the Texas court had rejected two prior leg-

150 See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 2 i6, 246-48 (D. Mass. 1975) (describing state and federal financial support for programs pairing universities and schools as part of a Boston desegregation decree); MOORE, supra note io6, at 243-44 (noting a grant of federal modernization funds to
the Boston Housing Authority); RAFFEL, supra note I17, at 120-53 (describing community organizations' support for implementation of a school desegregation order in Wilmington, Delaware); Pioneering Panel Hastens Pace of Child Welfare Reform, CASEY CONNECTS (Annie E.
Casey Found., Baltimore, Md.), Spring 2ooo, at i, available at http://www.aecf.org/publications/
data/connects..spring-oo.pdf (describing foundation support for child welfare reform implementation).
151 Cf DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 737-41, 745-48 (1993).

152 See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 5io A.2d 62i, 654-55 (N.J. 1986); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex. 1995).
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islative efforts). But it also seems likely that the courts were influenced by the fact that the statutes emerged from processes involving
broad mobilization by diverse constituencies, including representatives
of the plaintiff class.
2. Remedy: The Experimentalist Tendency. Sometimes decrees
in public law cases take an in terrorem or punitive form - threatening
or, far less often, imposing sanctions in order to induce compliance
with other orders.15 3 These background sanctions function as a kind
of "penalty default" - a result that no one is likely to prefer, intended
to induce the parties to negotiate a better one.15 4 In extreme cases, judicial intervention may temporarily preempt the authority of incumbent managers of defendant institutions, as with a receivership. But
the most characteristic public law decree makes substantive provision
for the management of the institution. Although these decrees can
take the form of relatively simple negative injunctions of limited scope,
they are often more comprehensive.
We have seen a tendency for comprehensive relief to move away
from detailed command-and-control prescriptions toward an experimentalist approach. This tendency is usefully captured in a model
with three general features. None of the cases we have examined fully
expresses all these features, but some come close, and the model systematically connects the distinctive and promising aspects of all of
them.
The basic features of this experimentalist tendency are these:
First, stakeholder negotiation. The parties come together to negotiate a remedial plan. 5 5 Other interested stakeholders can join under
153 See, e.g., Evans v. Williams, 35 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (D.D.C. 1999) (levying a $5 million contempt sanction against D.C. officials), rev'd, 206 F. 3 d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1999), consent order approved by 139 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2ooi); Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 169-70 (D. Colo.
1979) (ordering a Colorado prison closed); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491,
498-99 (Tex. 1991) (approving an order barring state funding of education unless a constitutionally adequate plan of school financing was developed); ROBERT COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE
378 (3 d ed. 2003) (noting that a trial judge in a Texas prison case ordered an $8o0,ooo per day
contempt sanction but later rescinded it after finding progress); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6,
at 124-25 (reporting a state court's repeated, but never executed, threats of contempt against the
Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors in a jail case).
154 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). Ayres and Gertner emphasize the function of "penalty
defaults" in contract law to induce the more informed party to disclose information. In our context, the key function is to force to the table a party who otherwise might not be willing to negotiate at all.
155 For an extensive analysis of such negotiations, including illustrations of the role of parties in
formulating remedies, see Sturm, supra note 15, at 1365-76. At least since Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996), the trial court must give a defendant institution the "first opportunity" to propose
a remedial plan. See id. at 362 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 4I1 U.S. 475, 492 (973)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But since the court is likely to treat respectfully the objections to such
a plan from plaintiffs who have prevailed on the merits, the defendant still has strong incentives
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liberal intervention standards. Groups that claim significant interests
will be admitted to the negotiations even if they are not formal parties.
Groups whose participation is thought important to the success of reform may be actively courted if they do not come on their own.
The negotiations may be superintended by a special master or mediator appointed by the court. These parajudicial officials, perhaps
along with expert advisers recruited by the court or the parties, will
help the parties to talk to each other in an organized way and to set an
agenda and ground rules for discussion. They will also assist in gathering information.
The negotiations are deliberative. The stakeholders meet face to
face, and they defend their positions with reasons. They are expected
to listen to each other in good faith and to remain open to learning. To
the extent that a party's proposals rest on factual premises, the party
must make available relevant information within her control.
The goal of the negotiation is consensus. The stakeholders should
be open to the possibility that, within the constraints imposed by the
determination of liability, they can agree on a remedial regime. The
master or facilitator strives for consensus. Ultimately, of course, consensus may not materialize. The master may have to return to the
court with multiple proposals, or with a proposal supported by the
master herself and some subset of the stakeholders. But the consensus
standard plays a valuable role even when no consensus is reached. It
prevents premature closure and reinforces the threshold commitment
156
of openness and mutual respect.

In practice, the extent to which deliberation occurs in remedial
formulation varies. Hostile defendants may resist dealing with the
plaintiffs, even if such resistance increases the risk that the court will
reject their own proposals. Special masters sometimes prefer to meet
with stakeholders seriatim and then try to craft an acceptable plan on
their own, rather than encouraging direct negotiations.15 7 Nevertheless, direct negotiations, with or without masters, are common. In
Plata, the California prison medical case, the parties agreed not to seek

to negotiate with the plaintiffs. See id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "process of
court-supervised negotiation that should generally precede systemic relief").
156 For case studies of stakeholder deliberation in public policy contexts, see THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999). Note especially the account of
negotiation among state and local government entities over the allocation of responsibility for affordable housing - the same general issue implicated in the Mount Laurel litigation. See Lawrence Susskind & Susan L. Podziba, Affordable Housing Mediation, in THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra, at 773-99.
157 Berger recounts his experience with this practice and illustrates its disadvantage. After the
master developed a plan intended to incorporate all the concerns expressed in separate meetings
with the stakeholders, nearly every stakeholder group attacked it, and the court felt compelled to
reject it. See Berger, supra note 15, at 730-33.
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a special master or other intermediary because they wanted to deal
with each other without any intermediation. 158
5 9
Second, the intervention takes the form of a rolling-rule regime.
The rules that emerge from the remedial negotiation are provisional.
They incorporate a process of reassessment and revision with continuing stakeholder participation.
The stakeholders recognize that they cannot effectively elaborate a
regime of fixed and specified rules. Even with the judicially supported
factfinding process, they have limited information. They cannot fully
express their intentions; they will inevitably leave gaps and ambigui160
ties; and they cannot anticipate all future contingencies.
We have seen that one response to this problem is to focus on outcome norms that leave broad discretion to those subject to them. Such
norms can be expressed in a variety of ways, ranging from the relatively specific and formal to the relatively general and informal. Since
the problems of incomplete knowledge and articulation also apply to
outcomes, informal norms that defer elaboration to the course of implementation have some appeal. But such an approach has important
disadvantages. First, it relieves the stakeholders of the responsibility
to clarify their understandings as much as possible. In addition, it defers the task of specification to situations in which the people governed
by the norms will have more saliently divergent interests. At the time
of the initial negotiation, some stakeholders will have a general sense
of their self-interest in the norms. But for many, and perhaps most,
stakeholders, there will be a good deal of uncertainty about how the
norms will mesh with self-interest. As implementation proceeds, particular actors will develop interests in particular interpretations of general norms. For example, public employees whose performance is being evaluated will develop a stake in interpretations most consistent
with their performance.

158 See Plata Stipulation, supra note 73; Telephone Interview with Don Specter, Staff Attorney,
Prison Law Office (July 16, 2002). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 constrains the typical use of masters as intermediaries by requiring that all their activities be on the record. It is not
clear whether the limitation applies only to appointees with the factfinding powers of traditional
masters or more broadly to more informal roles, such as court-appointed mediators or monitors.
See Boston, supra note 65, at 722.
159 CHARLES SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 7 (2000).

160 Looking back on a New York special education case, plaintiff's counsel wrote:
What the lawyers for both sides did not fully appreciate at the outset, however, was
that Dr. Gross's reorganization plan did not constitute a proven educational system that
could be fully implemented over time if sufficient resources were provided. Rather, it
was an imaginative proposal for beginning a structural reform process whose direction
and substance would be subject to ongoing reformulation.
Michael A. Rebell, Jose P v. Ambach: Special Education Reform in New York City, in JUSTICE
AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEMS, supra note 41, at 35.
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The model we are considering is inclined to deal with the problems
of limited information, articulation, and foresight less through informality than through provisionality At the outset, stakeholders try to
derive performance measures that are as specific as possible. These
measures will leave the parties substantial discretion, but they will
specify precise targets. Moreover, some processes, most often including
documentation and reporting, will be specified in detail. Such specification facilitates assessment of compliance. But it is expected that the
application of the norms will also be an occasion for their reassessment
and revision. Stakeholders continue to be involved in the processes of
monitoring and assessment. To the extent that any of them come to
believe that the norms no longer capture the appropriate expectations,
the norms can be revisited and revised through the assessment process.
If educational test scores are high because teachers have inappropriately narrowed the curriculum to "teach to the test," the test should be
revised or the weighting of the scores changed. If housing managers
are neglecting long-term maintenance in order to respond more quickly
to tenant complaints, a new performance measure focused on longterm tasks might be introduced. Participants seeking to excuse failures
of compliance by criticizing the standards must both give reasons for
their criticisms and propose revised standards to which they will be
held accountable in the future.
Of course, at each iteration, participants will seek to renegotiate the
standards in ways that benefit their private interests. The same
checks on opportunism that operate in the initial negotiation - the
awareness of common interests, the psychological pressures toward
honesty in the process of deliberative persuasion, and the prospect of a
penalty default in the absence of agreement - work at these later
stages. Moreover, in the later stages, defendants may face an additional pressure: to the extent they are attacking agreed-upon standards
that they have failed to meet, they have a higher burden of persuasion.
Reformers in Texas, for example, report significant progress in
dealing with the phenomenon of "teaching to the test." The first assessment test adopted under the Public School Accountability System
emphasized rote learning in a way that encouraged teachers to focus
on instruction that had little use outside the test. Students learning to
distinguish area from perimeter might be taught that area is "about
multiplication" and perimeter is "about addition." Even this relatively
crude regime produced important surprises. Some teachers who had
lost all hope in their pupils' aptitudes were shocked to discover that
they could be taught to take the test. But when complaints about
"teaching to the test" arose, collaboration between teachers and administrators produced a new testing regime that focused less on algorithmic pedagogy and more on conceptual learning. Students preparing for the test now learn that area is about coverage and is measured
by multiplying the lengths of the sides and that perimeter is about
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framing and is measured by addition of the lengths of the sides.
"Teaching to the test" is coming to mean teaching the power of ab61
straction. 1
In many cases, the decree is often limited to general descriptions of
the parties' goals, prescriptions for measuring their progress toward
them, and commitments to make information available. But the complete regime also often includes a variety of other norms that set out,
perhaps in great detail, practices or operating procedures. These practice norms will likely be set out in "plans," which may or may not be
filed in court, but which generally are not expected to be reviewed and
approved by the judge. The plans are intended to be easily revisable. 162 Sometimes the defendants can revise them unilaterally with
notice to the plaintiffs and the court. Other times the plaintiffs must
consent to revisions, and the court may intervene in the event of a dispute, but such intervention is expected to be rare. The decree may order the defendant to comply with the plans in force, but the norms in
the plans are generally not directly or immediately enforceable through
contempt. In principle, a further specific judicial directive could be a
predicate for contempt. In practice, courts usually intervene only in
cases of systemic noncompliance.
Thus, whatever the technical legal status of the plans, their function is not so much to coerce obedience as to induce internal deliberation and external transparency. Forcing the defendant practitioners to
agree on a clear description of their practices puts pressure on them to
reflect on and explain what they are doing. Moreover, the practice
norms enable outsiders to determine what the practitioners are up to.
They complement the performance norms by describing the inputs
63
that generate the outputs indicated by those norms. 1
The third element of the model is transparency. At a minimum,
this element restates the requirement that the policies and operating
norms of the rolling-rule regimes must be explicit and public. More
ambitiously, transparency means that there must be agreed-upon
measures and procedures for assessing compliance, and that these
procedures and their results must be made public.

161 Interview with W. David Hill, Deputy Director, Charles A. Dana Center, University of
Texas at Austin, in Austin, Tex. (Aug. 15, 2002).
162 Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the court approve a class
action settlement, and under Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (s992), a party
seeking to modify a consent decree over the objection of the other party must demonstrate "a significant change in facts or law." Id. at 393. Although the doctrine is not explicit, it seems
unlikely that either requirement applies to practice norms that are not directly incorporated into
the decree.
163 For a discussion of the distinction between performance and practice norms, see Am. Corr.
Ass'n, supra note 62, at xxii-xxviii.
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Transparency is both an accountability norm and a learning device.
It is intended in part to facilitate practices of disciplined comparison.
In deciding what level of performance can reasonably be expected, the
court and the parties can look to the performances of comparable
units. Once the frontrunners have been identified, the laggards should
be able to learn from the frontrunners' practices. Successful performers should be rewarded with greater autonomy and perhaps formal
honors or tangible rewards. The laggards should receive sanctions,
remedial assistance, or both.
The intuitions here are obvious, but transparency requires processes that are not widely found and that are often achieved only with
great difficulty. The obstacles are both political and technical. Organizations of all kinds often resist transparency. The poor performers
may resist it because it makes them vulnerable; the good performers
sometimes resist it because it deprives them of a competitive advantage. In practice, decrees typically require that information be made
available to the parties and other involved stakeholders, but not to the
public. The Texas education regime, partly nationalized by the No
Child Left Behind Act, 16 4 is an important exception: it mandates that
school and district performance data be publicly available.
Moreover, disciplined comparisons require that performance data
be formulated in a manner that permits comparative assessment. A
common set of metrics must be devised, and participants must be induced to report data in these terms. In the public sector, this process is
most developed in the educational field. HUD's Public Housing Assessment System represents another sophisticated development along
these lines. 16 In other areas, such as police conduct and prisons, even
fairly sophisticated monitoring systems have not yet developed the
kind of reporting and metrics that permit such comparisons.
A more difficult issue is figuring out what interventions courts
should make once performances have been ranked. While tangible
rewards for high performance are possible, as in some statutory education schemes, the principal reward for good performance in the judicial
context will be the autonomy that comes from relaxed judicial scrutiny
and termination of the decree. Disciplined comparisons may also generate intangible rewards in the form of respect and prestige for highperforming institutions.
As for poor performance, the trick is to balance remedial support,
loss of control, and outright punishment. Administrators are quick to
claim that inadequate performance is the result of insufficient resources. To some extent, disciplined comparisons of performance rela-

164 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 9622(c)(I)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
165 See supra pp. 1049-50.
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tive to resource levels can check such claims. Where such claims are
substantiated, targeted resources may be the answer, as they are in
some of the statutory "new accountability" education regimes. Where
bad performance is unexcused, then the choices are increased outside
intervention or punitive sanctions. If increased intervention takes the
form of specific dictation of conduct, it will incur the disadvantages of
command-and-control regulation and may allow the defendant administrator to shift responsibility for problems to the court or the plaintiffs. Outright replacement of the failing administrators, as in the receivership remedy that Congress has approved for poor housing
authority performance, does not result in these problems, but such a
remedy is only available in extreme situations. Punitive sanctions are
difficult to calibrate, and there are many doctrinal and political obstacles to applying them.1 66 Moreover, they deter the cooperation and
information-sharing among stakeholders upon which the rolling-rule
regime depends.
Experimentalism does not provide determinate guidance on the
question of sanctions. It pins its hopes largely on the effects of transparency. By exposing poor performance as clearly as possible, it opens
the system to general scrutiny and exposes it more readily to nonjudicial intervention.
D. DestabilizationEffects
The practical questions that parallel the jurisprudential question of
the relation of right and remedy are: What happens in the litigation
that makes agreement among adversaries possible? And why should
the resulting agreement be generally beneficial? In some cases, agreement on remedy follows a hard-fought battle on liability. Even when
liability is conceded, plaintiffs and defendants are often at loggerheads.
Yet with surprising frequency the fighting is followed by substantial
agreement on a remedial framework that contemplates ongoing cooperation.16 7 What is going on?
The idea of destabilization rights suggests an important part of the
answer. The liability determination imposed or ratified by the court
and subject to the experimentalist discipline of the remedial phase can

166 See Evans v. Williams, 206 F3d 1292, 1295-97 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing doctrinal barriers to imposing punitive fines).
167 See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 112, at 57 (reporting that after years of hard-fought litigation,
the parties agreed on an implementation methodology for Mount Laurel); Note, The Wyatt Case:
Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1367
(1975) (noting that although defendants in the Alabama mental health case initially resisted judicial intervention, after a finding of liability, they and the plaintiffs were able to agree on "over 9o
percent of the required standards").

1074

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 117:IOI

5

have a series of disentrenching effects.1 68 These effects work at the individual, institutional, and inter-institutional or social levels. At the
individual level, these effects appear rooted in much-discussed cognitive and psychological features of human sociability that are at odds
with traditional conceptions of human actors as either calculating private utility maximizers or dispassionate Kantian moralists.
There are six principal effects:
i. The Veil Effect. - The struggle for selfish advantage is impeded
at the outset of remedial negotiations by the fact that the parties find
themselves partially veiled in ignorance. They cannot count on their
prior positions, and it may be hard for them to anticipate what their
positions will be like in the alternative future regimes under consideration.
The more daring the reforms under consideration, and the more the
parties are committed to continuous self-revision, the harder it will be
for any particular player to anticipate what a particular reform will
mean for her with respect to such matters as compensation, resources,
authority, job satisfaction, and workload. The ability to pursue selfish
interests is constrained by the inherent uncertainty of how selfish goals
will be served in as yet untried arrangements, and by the difficulty of
entrenching any particular arrangement in a regime of continuous selfassessment and revision.
Consider the position of a school principal in a case challenging the
system of which her institution is a part. She may believe that her institution is exceptionally capable of excelling on particular performance measures, or she may believe that it is exceptionally likely to fare
poorly. In such a case, where the likely outcomes are known, selfinterest may push her to favor particular remedies. (We will call this a
"stakeholder effect" in a moment.) But it seems likely that at least as
often, she will be uncertain about how her institution will fare. She
may not know how her performance would compare with peer institutions. In addition, she may not know whether the consequences of
poor performance, which initially are likely to include remedial assistance, are on balance good or bad for her.
Or consider the representative of a prison guard union responding
to a proposal in a remedial negotiation to improve safety by screening

168 In some cases that are settled without judicial findings of liability, notably in the area of
police misconduct, the defendants do not explicitly concede wrongdoing, and the settlement
agreement may even disclaim such a concession. See, e.g., Los Angeles Consent Decree, supra
note 87, at para. 3. Such disclaimers, however, are largely for the purpose of obviating evidentiary admissions that might fuel later damage actions. In order to enter the remedial negotiations
and conclude a remedial agreement, the defendant has to acknowledge at least a substantial
probability that the plaintiff might prevail on her claim. Such a concession should often be sufficient to induce the psychological effects we describe.
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and segregating prisoners with certain psychiatric diagnoses. The proposal undoubtedly implicates the selfish interests of her constituents.
A new class of specialized roles will be created; mental health professionals will play a larger role in the institution. Yet how such contingencies map onto the selfish interests of the guards is harder to say.
Perhaps the newcomers will diminish the authority and autonomy of
the guards; perhaps they will make the guards' jobs easier or less
stressful. On the other hand, the impact of the reform on the interest
in safety that the guards share with the other stakeholders seems easier
to assess and predict. In such situations, stakeholders may have no
better prediction of their own interests than their intuitions of the general interest.
By blurring the distinction between particular and general interests, the liability judgment approximates in actuality the conditions
that political theorists such as John Rawls have considered hypothetically as aids to democratic decisionmaking. Rawls urges us to assess
proposed public decisions by asking if they would be adopted if we
were unaware of how they would affect our selfish interests.1 69 There
is a crucial difference, however, between Rawls's "original position"
and the situation created by the liability judgment. In entering the
"original position," participants in a political discussion are exiting the
world. The impartiality of their exchange depends on abstracting
from all the features of their actual activities and selves. There is considerable debate about whether it is possible to obtain such a neutral
"view from nowhere," and if so, whether arrangements figured from
this remove are specific enough to be translated into reality. 17 0
The veil of ignorance arising from the finding or concession of liability does not require that the participants remove themselves from
the world, but rather that they open themselves to it in a new way.
The mutual learning that prudence suggests may cause them to change
their view of the possibilities - even as they put their identities at risk
by reorienting their goals, their ideas of potential collaborations, and
their understanding of fruitful problem-solving strategies.
2. The Status Quo Effect. The liability determination reverses
the normal presumption in favor of the status quo. Without knowing
what the new regime will be, the parties presume that it will be different from the way things have been. The condemnation of the status
quo has a distinct cognitive effect: it releases the mental grip of conventional structures on the capacity to consider alternatives.

169 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-201 (1971).
170 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
37-39 (1996).
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Recent empirical psychology emphasizes that there are powerful
cognitive tendencies toward entrenchment of the status quo. The
"availability heuristic" suggests that contingencies that can be more
readily visualized are likely to be given more consideration or greater
weight than equally relevant but less easily imagined alternatives. The
"endowment effect" suggests that people tend to demand more to give
up something they already have than they would offer to acquire the
same thing from someone else. Study of attitudes toward risk has indicated that people are more averse to dangers they perceive as losses
rather than as failures to gain, even though these perceptions are quite
manipulable. (A price differential for cash or credit will be regarded
differently depending on whether it is called a credit surcharge or a
cash discount.)' 7
The liability determination mitigates these effects. It counters the
relative availability of the status quo by stigmatizing it. It signals that
various positions entailed by the status quo are not entitlements of
those who argue for them. The pronouncement that current arrangements will not continue should cause the perception of relative risks to
change. The former regime no longer represents a potential loss but is
simply one of many possible arrangements, and indeed a relatively unpromising one. The willingness to consider alternatives should thus
broaden.
3. The Deliberation Effect. - The parties' increased openness to
alternatives goes hand in hand with increased pressure to support positions by giving reasons grounded in public values. Unable to appeal
to institutional inertia, the parties have greater incentives to devise arguments that persuade by the validity of their reasons. It is a core
premise of a venerable, recently revived tradition of politics that justifying one's position by giving reasons and responding to reasoned arguments for competing views can alter a person's understanding of her
factual circumstances and her interests, disclosing previously unseen

opportunities. 172
For example, in a recent settlement of a "racial profiling" case, the
California Highway Patrol agreed to stop its practice of asking motorists to "consent" to a search in cases where there was no probable
cause. The plaintiffs objected that the incidence of such requests was
racially biased and that the consents that were invariably given were
not voluntary. The highway patrol agreed to abandon the practice
when it learned during the negotiations that the practice was producing virtually no evidence or arrests. Until the highway patrol was sub-

171 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194-96, 197-99 (1991).
172 See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 17o, at 37-39.
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jected to pressure to justify its position, it had not systematically
evaluated the practice. Once it did, it had to concede its indefensibility. 173

4. The Publicity Effect. - The vindication of the plaintiff's claim
will focus public attention on the problems. Public scrutiny of all the
stakeholders, and especially of the defendants, may increase. This increased scrutiny will generate diffuse but sometimes powerful pressures for responsible behavior. Public officials trying to reform their
institutions may find that they can capitalize on publicity to mobilize
support for their efforts. Officials who might have preferred simply to
duck the issues will now feel pressure to take a position. The result
could be irresponsible demagoguery; but given the pressure for public
reason-giving exerted by the deliberation effect, the outcome in the setting of the new public law is perhaps more likely to be constructive
engagement. In the early prison cases, for example, publicity about
horrific conditions - sometimes welcomed by officials, sometimes not
- appears to have played an important role in facilitating remedial
progress. 174
5. The Stakeholder Effects. - There are three stakeholder effects:
the balance of power between plaintiff and defendant shifts; internal
pressures are generated within the plaintiff class and the defendant institution; and new stakeholders are motivated or empowered to participate.
First, the liability determination empowers the plaintiffs vis-A-vis
the defendants. It provides official legitimation of their claims. The
plaintiffs now have the power, simply by objecting to the defendant's
proposed remedy, to expose the defendant to further risk and uncertainty. Consequently, the defendant has stronger reason to deal with
the plaintiffs.
Second, the remedial situation may transform both plaintiffs and
defendants. The plaintiffs' lawyers or the organizations for which they
work may now be eligible for attorneys' fees. Additionally, the court
may induce the defendant or some other institution to provide resources for the negotiation, or private contributions may be induced by

173 See Terms and Conditions of Settlement Agreement, Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No.
C 9 9 -2o8 9 5 -JF/HRL (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://www.aclunc.org/police/o3o227rodriguez.pdf; E-mail from Michelle Alexander, Plaintiffs' Counsel, Rodriguez, to William H.
Simon (Mar. 2, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
174 For consideration of the influence of litigation-related publicity on prison reform, see Margo

Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1678-8o (2003). In a paper assessing negotiated resolutions of water-quality issues, David J. Hayes identifies the degree of general public
interest in the negotiations as an important variable favoring success. David J. Hayes, FederalState Decision-Making on Water: Applying Lessons Learned 15-6 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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the plaintiffs' success. 75 Accordingly, plaintiffs will be strengthened
both by the prestige that accompanies success and by new resources.
There may be internal effects on the defendant as well. As an institution, the defendant is typically composed of diverse constituencies.
The liability finding or concession may upset accommodations among
them. Constituencies with views and interests overlapping those of the
plaintiffs will see the determination as an opportunity to enhance their
influence. The craft pride of some rank-and-file workers and the professionalism of some managers will lead them to resent the shoddy or
corrupt practices attacked by the plaintiffs and to favor higher standards. Some senior managers may see in the remedial process the
prospect of more resources or greater prestige.
Colin Diver speculates that there is a tendency for power to shift
within the defendant institution from senior executive officials with
general supervisory responsibilities to "operating managers" and, at a
lower level, from nonprofessional staff, such as guards and orderlies,
to professional staff, such as lawyers and doctors.17 6 The operating
managers have the kind of detailed knowledge necessary to plan compliance, and the professionals are most likely to understand and be
committed to the standards the court has applied. The tendency, on
this view, is to decentralize to the level of the institution but to centralize within the institution.
This view may have been generally true of the old public law cases.
It arguably describes, for example, the trajectory of early reform in
Southern prisons. However, it mischaracterizes change under the new
public law because it presupposes the command-and-control style of
intervention that is being superseded in practice. Experimentalist regimes often involve dramatic decentralization within institutions, as
lower-tier workers get increased discretion to cope with contingencies
with which they are most familiar. For example, teachers in the "new
accountability" scheme have more flexibility in classroom planning
175 Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod argue that stakeholder participation is dominated by
lawyers with little effective accountability to their putative clients. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 124-29. We find this argument implausible. It is specifically contradicted
by many case histories recording substantial and meaningful stakeholder participation. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note io6, at 240-55 (Boston Housing Authority); ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra
note 5i, at 114-18 (Willowbrook); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 67-1o8 (Kentucky and
Texas education cases). It is true that stakeholders in these cases are commonly underorganized
and vulnerable and that there are many failures of professional loyalty and accountability. However, Sandier and Schoenbrod's implication that structural litigation reduces the effective participation of plaintiff class members is counterintuitive. If we assume that stakeholders are so poorly
organized and vulnerable that they cannot hold accountable the lawyers purporting to represent
them, there is no reason to expect that they would do better in the general electoral or administrative processes. Moreover, the remedial mechanisms designed to enforce defendant accountability
can also strengthen the accountability of plaintiff representatives. See infra pp. 1093-94.
176 See Diver, supra note 2, at 70-73.
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than before. One of the first moves of public housing receivers is to
increase the responsibility for maintenance of individual project managers relative to the central office.
At the same time, the relatively objective and transparent accountability mechanisms of experimentalism can also facilitate more effective monitoring from above the institution. This monitoring reduces
reliance on unspoken, insider knowledge by forcing participants to
produce important information in a form that can be used by outsiders
not directly involved in the process. The principal goal is to facilitate
accountability to diverse stakeholders, but the practice is compatible
with some forms of recentralization.
Performance scoring in "new accountability" education reform is
designed to have both centralizing and decentralizing effects. State
agencies are supposed to use the data to allocate resources among districts and to pressure low-performing districts; the provision of data on
individual schools is designed to encourage and assist parental participation in efforts to improve children's schools. Both effects have been
observed in some areas of Texas.177
The stakeholder effect on the defendant cannot be assessed solely
in terms of the distribution of knowledge and competences at the time
negotiations begin. Implementation often involves significant training
of existing personnel, recruitment of new personnel, and sometimes,
departure of incumbents. Thus, while the internal effect on the defendant is potentially dramatic, we cannot generalize strongly about its
direction. Many trajectories are possible, depending on the type of
remedial regime the parties favor.
Finally, the third stakeholder effect is that new stakeholders are
likely to appear. The court's judgment may lead a variety of actors to
see their interests as threatened, or to see opportunities that induce
them to seek to participate. Wyatt v. Stickney, the seminal mental
health case, began as a protest by mental health workers, who invoked
the interests of residents to protest planned staff cutbacks.17s The
prospect of the "builder's remedy" in Mount Laurel mobilized real estate developers to side with the plaintiffs on various issues. 179 We
177 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note i6, at 241-47.
178 See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Note, supra note 167, at
1347. We don't suggest that these new stakeholders will always be helpful to reform efforts. Police and prison guard unions, for example, often actively resist reforms. See Pamela A. MacLean,
The Strong Arm of the Law, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2002, at 24 (reporting on how the California prison
guard union uses extensive political power to impede efforts to hold guards accountable for abusive conduct). Also, public employee unions sometimes promote featherbedding. See SANDLER
& SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 78-81 (suggesting that a social workers' union persuaded the
judge in a special education case to force a school board to include social workers on assessment
teams unnecessarily).
179 See HAAR, supra note 112, at 44-45.
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have noted that some of the education cases have mobilized business
groups and universities t o participate in planning and implementing
remedies. In Texas, for example, the Edgewood regime prompted the
creation of two statewide nonprofit organizations - Just for Kids and
the Educational Innovation Network - devoted to helping local
groups use performance data to improve their schools.' 80
In the Willowbrook case, the shift from institutional to community
placement was accompanied by the emergence of nonprofit groups
that wanted to run the new facilities and of real estate interests that
wanted to profit from their development. Both groups gave important
support to the plaintiffs' efforts, leading close observers of these events
to conclude that "the process of opening group homes, like that of contracting with the voluntary agencies, created a constituency for
deinstitutionalization."' 8
6. The Web Effect. - Just as the court's liability determination destabilizes relations and practices within the defendant institution, so
does it ramify to other institutions and practices. These ramifications,
and their monitored feedback on the institutions in the case, are the
web effect. The web effect makes it possible to address sequentially
- in a sequence determined in the course of problem-solving itself reforms too complex to be addressed whole. This effect is polycentricity viewed as an aid, not an obstacle, to problem solving.
Of course, the notion of "positive polycentricity" was an oxymoron
to post-Chayes commentators on public law remedies. As we saw,
they assumed that if courts cannot control all the effects of intervention, the collateral effects will undermine their efforts. Better to leave
the problem to an institution that can intervene comprehensively or, in
a world where all institutions have limited information and limited
control, to do nothing. These commentators thus assumed away the
possibility that gives rise to the web effect and that helps explain the
promise of new public law generally: that under favorable conditions
the partial interventions that limited information does allow can be informative enough to allow subsequent corrective measures, giving rise
to new rounds of interventions and corrections.
Albert Hirschman anticipated this possibility in his "unbalanced
growth" criticism of both comprehensive central planning and laissezfaire in economic development. Hirschman pointed out that economic
development in market societies occurs through "chain[s] of disequilib-

180 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 16, at 243-46; see also RAFFEL, supra note I17, at 120-53

(discussing community organizations' support for the implementation of the Wilmington school
desegregation decree).
181 ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 5 I , at 195. See generally id. at 150-99.
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'5 2 A discrete disturbance
ria."'
causes pressures that ramify throughout
other areas. In particular, pressures spill back and forth between public and private realms. Private activity generates demand and pressure for complementary public goods (in, say, roads or education), and
vice versa. Using the same metaphor as Fuller but reaching the opposite conclusion, Hirschman suggested that the "cobweb" structures of
market disruptions and adjustments are not imperfections to be minimized or superseded by more coordinated processes. The process of
iterative disequilibration and readjustment is, in fact, a learning process that cannot be readily short-circuited. It potentially generates
valuable human capital and creates incentives in a distinctively efficient way:
In other words, our aim must be to keep alive rather than to eliminate the
disequilibria ....
If the economy is to be kept moving ahead, the task of
development policy is to maintain tensions, disproportions, and disequilibria. That nightmare of equilibrium economics, the endlessly spinning
cobweb, is the kind of mechanism we must assiduously look for as an in183
valuable help in the development process.

One indication of the web effect in new public law litigation is the
tendency for the focus of concern to shift in the course of litigation.
Thus, in education and housing, concerns about discrimination often
quickly lead to concerns about quality of service. In prisons, concerns
about conditions lead to concerns about length of confinement. In all
areas, issues of personnel, training, and recruitment typically surface.
So do resource questions. These connections were not invisible before
182 Hirschman maintains that "nonmarket forces are not necessarily less 'automatic' than market forces." ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 64
(1958). He elaborates:
[For example, w]hen supply difficulties arise in the course of uneven progress in sectors
- such as education and public utilities - where private enterprise is not operating,
strong pressures are felt by public authorities to "do something"; and since the desire for
political survival is at least as strong a motive force as the desire to realize a profit, we
may ordinarily expect some corrective action to be taken.
Id.
183 Id. at 66. The strategy of "import substitution" - subsidies and trade protection for local
businesses producing for local demand, which policymakers derived from Hirschman's idea overlooked the possibility that self-interested groups would exploit the turmoil of disequilibrium
to slip into and entrench themselves within the state machinery of developing countries. When
this happened, Hirschman's prescriptions for government economic policy lost favor. See, e.g.,
Anne 0. Krueger, The PoliticalEconomy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291,
302 (1974). But the subsequent emergence in business practice of continuous improvement disciplines using induced disequilibria vindicated Hirschman's basic intuition that such disequilibria
might provide important learning opportunities. See, e.g., Paul Adler, Time and Motion Regained, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 97. These disciplines combined the kind of destabilization mechanisms Hirschman favored with monitoring and transparency procedures that
checked opportunism. See Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 137, 137-65 (Neil J. Smelser

& Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
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the liability determination; they just come to seem more prominent
and urgent.
The web effect is also evident in the institutional complementarities
induced by public law. Just as investment in, say, office building construction may prompt investment in steel and concrete by increasing
the prospective returns to the latter, in the institutional reform context,
one intervention within an institution can lead to further interventions.
Critics of institutional reform litigation continually point out that
courts lack the ability to compel the appropriation of funds for the improvements they mandate. Yet in each of the areas discussed in this
Article, legislatures, agencies, or nongovernmental organizations volunteered resources once the courts acted. 184 For these supporters, the
court's intervention appeared to raise the prospective return on investments in the institution.

IV. THE EXPERIMENTALIST APPROACH
AND DOCTRINAL ISSUES
If our descriptive account in Part II is right, then much academic
and appellate doctrinal discussion of public law litigation is not responsive to the most promising elements of recent practice. We now
address how the experimentalist approach relates to four key areas of
doctrinal controversy: the scope of the equitable discretion of the trial
court, the separation of powers, the problem of attribution of agent
misconduct to government institutions, and the problem of interest
representation. In each case, the newer model has promising suggestions for the resolution of persistent concerns.
A. Remedial Discretion
The Rehnquist Court has been unsympathetic to public law litigation. In a series of decisions, the Court has purported to derive constraints on remedial discretion from the nature of the rights in question. It would be a mistake to dismiss the Court's hostility as merely
ideological. For one thing, in some of its key attacks on public law, the
Court took issue with remedial regimes that were manifestly ineffective. Moreover, these decisions identified important conditions for the
effectiveness of structural remedies. Nevertheless, the Court's rationales for its decisions have been individually implausible and mutually
incoherent.
18 5
Three cases illustrate the problems. First, Missouri v. Jenkins
proposed that trial courts limit their remedial discretion through a

184 See supra pp. xo65-66 & n.15O.
115 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Jenkins IV).
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18 6
complex exercise of factual determination. Second, Lewis v. Casey
proposed that, to the extent remedial issues were indeterminate, the
lower court should defer to the defendant. On reflection, the Jenkins
approach proves impossible to execute, and the Lewis approach selfdefeating. The shared premise of these cases is that remedial indeterminacy must be resolved either through the court's own decision or
through deference to the agency. In fact, the experimentalist approach
shows that this is a false dichotomy that excludes the most promising
alternative. We find a partial acknowledgment of greater complexity
in an earlier case - Youngberg v. Romeo,8 7 which even as it tries to
preempt judicial intervention points the way to its experimentalist
variants.
Upon finding unlawful segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri
School District by the district and the state, the Jenkins trial court issued a series of orders with the declared goal of "elimination of all vestiges of state imposed segregation," particularly the low "student
achievement."'' 88 Given the small fraction of nonminority students in
the district, pupil reassignment would make little progress toward racial balance. So the decrees focused on measures designed to improve
the quality of education enough to attract students away from the suburbs through voluntary interdistrict transfer. In the absence of any
precise idea of what actually makes schools effective and therefore attractive, this program of "desegrative attractiveness" became a program of establishing "suburban comparability": making the Kansas
City schools as much like their best suburban counterparts as the initially vast reserves of goodwill and funding (the latter enhanced by
new contributions from the state) would allow.' 8 9
Under the decree, class sizes were reduced to the levels required for
certification in the highest category of the state Board of Education's
ranking system. The salaries of virtually all of the 5000 staff members
were increased. The school district made an early childhood development program, full-day kindergarten, expanded summer school, and
before- and after-school tutoring available to all students. Some fiftyfive schools were renovated, eighteen closed, and seventeen new ones
constructed. In ordering the renovations, the district court rejected the
state's "'patch and repair' approach" because it "would not achieve
suburban comparability or the visual attractiveness sought by the
Court as it would result in floor coverings with unsightly sections of
mismatched carpeting and tile, and individual walls possessing differ-

186 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
187 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
188 Jenkins IV, 515 U.S. at 74 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 69 F. Supp. 19, 23, 24 (W.D. Mo.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 Id. at 78, 98.
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ent shades of paint."' 90 The plan called for air conditioning and fifteen personal computers in every high school classroom. Other facilities included:
a 2,ooo-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre
farm with an air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model
United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio
and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature
controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening rooms; a 3,5oo-squarefoot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1,875-square-foot elementary school
animal rooms for use in a zoo project; [and] swimming pools ....191

The district court's plan was plausibly described as "the most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of school desegregation. "192

Set against the district court's goal of eliminating the "vestiges of
segregation," however, the benefits of the first rounds of this program,
as reflected in performance on standardized tests, were meager. The
district court noted a "trend of improvement" in academic achievement
but found the district "still at or below national norms on many grade
levels." It provided no guidance on how to accelerate reform. Instead,
the court observed almost wistfully that it had "allowed the District
planners to dream" and "provided the mechanism for th[ose] dreams to
' 193
be realized.
When the state appealed, the Supreme Court held this remedial
scheme improper on the ground that it was not adequately connected
to the proven violations of the plaintiffs' rights. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the untethered character of
the district court's order:
The District Court's pursuit of "desegregative attractiveness" cannot be
reconciled with our cases placing limitations on a district court's remedial
authority. It is certainly theoretically possible that the greater the expenditure per pupil within the KCMSD, the more likely it is that some unknowable number of nonminority students not presently attending schools
in the KCMSD will choose to enroll in those schools. Under this reasoning, however, every increased expenditure, whether it be for teachers, noninstructional employees, books, or buildings, will make the KCMSD in
some way more attractive, and thereby perhaps induce nonminority stu-

190 Id. at 78.

191Id. at 79 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins 11), 495 U.S. 33, 77 (199 o ) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
192 Id. at 78 (quoting Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, i9 F.3 d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bean,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
193 Id. at 79-80 (quoting the appendix to the petition for certiorari) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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dents to enroll in its schools. But this rationale is not susceptible to any
objective limitation. 194

The "objective limitation" the Court had in mind was the doctrine
announced in prior cases that remedial practice should be limited to
undoing the "incremental segregative effect" of particular official acts
in violation of the Constitution - that is, "to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct."'1 95 From this point of view, the district
court's excesses resulted from its initial failure to "identif[y] the incremental effect that segregation has had on minority student achieve'
ment or the specific goals of the quality education programs. "196
The Supreme Court's objection to the aimless and undisciplined
character of the lower court's efforts is understandable, but the "incremental effect" doctrine has little promise of improving things. The
effort to isolate such effects poses insuperable factfinding burdens because of the "polycentricity" that critics of public law litigation have
emphasized. Public law problems invariably result from the complex
interaction of conduct by myriad actors. It is highly unlikely that
courts could ever command the evidence or methodology necessary to
isolate the effects of particular unlawful decisions.
Moreover, even if a court could isolate the present effects of specific
past unlawful acts, it is not clear how this finding would constrain its
remedial authority. If the court must limit its orders to the same matters as those involved in the past unlawful conduct - for example,
pupil assignment - then it may find that its only permissible options
are unlikely to mitigate the harm. Pupil reassignments, for example,
have little remedial potential where minority students predominate the
entire system. Ineffectuality, of course, was a critical objection to the
Jenkins decree. Alternatively, the incremental effect doctrine might
mean that the trial judge has authority to order remedial measures of
any kind as long as they are demonstrably likely to produce improvements proportional to the proven harm of past illegality. But this does
not seem like much of a limit. There are innumerable potential ways
of producing any given measure of improvement.
Finally, the narrow, specific decrees urged by the Jenkins majority
can be both inefficiently rigid and unnecessarily intrusive on executive
authority. Although Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod endorse the
Jenkins approach, one of their prime illustrations of inappropriate judicial intervention is a provision imposing strict deadlines for processing pupil assessments in the New York City special education pro194
195

Id. at 98 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
Id, at 87 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)) (internal quotation mark

omitted).
196

Id. at ioi (citing Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977)).
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gram. They plausibly object that these requirements induced school
personnel to sacrifice quality and to divert resources from other important programs in order to meet the deadlines. But the deadlines were
among the provisions of the decree
derived directly, Jenkins-style, from
19 7
the (in this case) statutory right.
A second approach to remedial discretion is illustrated by Lewis v.
Casey. In an earlier case - Bounds v. Smith1 9 8 - the Court affirmed
an order, based on the constitutional right of access to the courts, requiring a state prison system to maintain law libraries. In Lewis, inmates challenged the Arizona prison libraries as inadequate under
Bounds. After finding for the plaintiffs, the district court appointed a
special master to determine "how best to accomplish the goal of constitutionally adequate inmate access to the courts" and adopted, substantially unchanged, his twenty-five-page proposal as a permanent injunction. 199 This "microscopically detailed order" included provisions
dictating the hours of operation for the libraries, the amount of time
prisoners must be permitted to use them, the minimum credentials of
library staff, the forms to be used for requesting books, permissible
noise levels in the libraries, the curriculum of the introductory course
on legal research for prisoners, and the books and other materials to be
20 0
made available.
The Supreme Court struck down the order. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia criticized the lower court for acting as if the constitutional right in question were "the right to a law library." In fact, the
right recognized in the court's prior cases was a "right of access to the
courts."2 ° l The remedy was thus objectionable in two respects. First,
it was not supported by an adequate showing of violation of right.
The plaintiffs needed to show not simply that the library was inadequate, but also that they had claims that they had been unable to present to the courts. Second, even if the plaintiffs had shown an impairment of access, it would be error to mandate this particular
response when a variety of other ones - different types of libraries or
different combinations of written materials and professional assistance
- might be equally effective. The lower court should have given the
defendant more opportunity to design a responsive remedy before it
imposed one over its objection.
Arguably, the trial court in Lewis had followed the mandate of Jenkins to define the constitutional harm as narrowly and precisely as
197 SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 68-72, 92-93, 197-204.
198 430 U.S. 817 (977).
199 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 347 (i996) (quoting the appendix to the petition for certiorari)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
200 Id. at 390 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201 Lewis, 5,8 U.S. at 350.
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possible. The Supreme Court, by insisting that the right in question
was considerably more general than the trial court assumed, made the
remedial possibilities broader and more indeterminate. The Lewis
opinion proposed to resolve this indeterminacy by deferring to the
agency. However, such deference is a crude solution to the problem of
indeterminacy exacerbated by the Court's expansive approach to defining rights. In any given case, there is likely to be a dispute about
how much deference is appropriate given the defendant's proven misconduct. Justice Stevens's dissent in Lewis argued that the agency had
had opportunities to develop remedial plans in both this and a prior
case involving similar claims, and that its record of noncooperation
justified the district court's decision to preempt it.202 Moreover, there
has to be some limit to deference, and Lewis says little about what it
should be.
A possible response can be found in our third case, Youngberg v.
Romeo - a challenge to the conditions of confinement at Pennhurst, a
20 3
now notorious institution for the mentally retarded in Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff asserted that, as an involuntarily committed resident, he
had constitutional rights to reasonable safety, freedom from unnecessary restraint, and minimally adequate habilitation, all of which were
violated by Pennhurst's shoddy practices. After affirming that civilly
committed inmates had constitutional rights of the sort the plaintiff alleged, the Court considered how those rights should be delimited. It
rejected the lower court's holding that measures infringing an inmate's
liberty or safety interests required a "'compelling' or 'substantial' necessity." It concluded that this standard would pose "an undue burden
on the administration of institutions such as Pennhurst" and would require judges to "second-guess" institutional judgments they were unqualified to assess. Yet instead of requiring the general administrative
deference proposed by Lewis, the Youngberg Court spoke of "deference
to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional":
[Lliability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is

such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the20 person
responsible actually
4
did not base the decision on such a judgment.
This precept is a more limited form of deference than the Lewis
standard. We have noted that professional service providers in defen-

202 Id. at 411-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Youngberg was an individual damage action rather than an institu-

tional reform case, but the issue it raised about the constitutional standard of care was the core
issue in institutional reform cases, and the holding was thus influential in subsequent institutional
cases. See, e.g., Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248-49 (2d
Cir. 1984).
204

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at

322-23.
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dant institutions often agree with a substantial range of the plaintiffs'
claims, and that top administrators sometimes concede that their own
decisions do not comply with applicable standards and hence are not
"professional decisions" in the Court's sense. Although the Youngberg
standard was prescribed for mental health cases, it expresses the practical reality in many cases in other areas: professional staff acquire increased influence over compliance regardless of the express provisions
20 5
of the decree.
Nevertheless, the Court's approach is subject to two objections.
First, in accepting as "presumptively valid" any official decision not so
egregious as to be disqualified as unprofessional, the Court is not substituting administrative expertise for amateurish judicial speculation.
Rather, it gives preference to the opinion of an administratively appointed expert over the opinion of a judicially appointed expert.
When courts impose remedies in public law cases, they do not devise
them ex nihilo but rather formulate them from the advice of experts
they have appointed. The library system in Lewis, for example, was
not designed by the court, but by "a law professor from Flushing, New
York. ' 20 6 Even granting the Court's criticisms of some of these remedies, there is no reason to regard the expertise of an authority chosen
by a judge to review the decisions of other experts as systematically inferior to the judgment of one of the experts under review.
Perplexity only increases when - here the second objection - the
official to whose judgment the Court would defer inhabits an institution that the larger body of professional opinion condemns. This is of
course precisely the circumstance at Pennhurst. Looking back at its
ruling in another case against Pennhurst, the district court observed
that "no one took issue with the many professionals in the field of
mental retardation who testified that 'normalization' [i.e., deinstitutionalization] has been universally accepted as the only successful
method of habilitating a retarded person. ' 20 7 There are no doubt better and worse ways of managing an institution that fails to meet its legal and other obligations to those it serves. A court, however, is unlikely to discern the better choices simply by deferring to the views of
the officials of the condemned institution.
The Pennhurst litigation, as it evolved after the Supreme Court's
decision, reflected a further, more general shift in the character of professional opinion. Youngberg assumed the traditional picture in which
an individual practitioner, drawing on a particular, specialized discipline, confronts and resolves problems in a substantially tacit and soli-

205

See Diver, supra note 2, at 70-73. But note the qualification in supra pp. 1078-79.

206 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 363.

207 Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215, 220 (E.D. Pa. i992).
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tary way. In the decades during which the Pennhurst litigation proceeded, this conception changed. Increasingly, professional decisionmaking came to be seen as the serviceable but provisional product of
an ongoing, mutually critical discussion among experts with backgrounds in different disciplines. The more pronounced this tendency,
the less sense it made to speak of deference to the views of a particular
professional: individual professionals did not "have" views, collaborative groups of experts did.
The Pennhurst Final Settlement Agreement showed succinctly how
this change could transform the meaning of "professional" underlying
Youngberg: the Agreement specified that the services provided by the
Commonwealth and other government entities to the class members
were to be determined "by a professional judgment, expressed through
the interdisciplinary team process. ' 20 8 This usage was hardly singular.
By the mid-ig8os, "interdisciplinary team" appeared often in cases involving the rights of the mentally retarded as a term of art requiring
little or no further definition.2 0 9
The key characteristics of this revised conception of professional
decisionmaking are collaborative dialogue, provisionality, and transparency 10 - the very characteristics of what we call the experimentalist approach. To the extent this view of professionalism converges
with experimentalism, it suggests a way out of the problem of judicial
discretion. The court need not choose between deriving remedies from
ambiguous substantive norms on the one hand and deferring to manifestly unreliable executive officials on the other. Instead, it can try to
create a process in which the stakeholders collaboratively derive standards, procedures for revising them, and mechanisms of accountability
for those subject to them. The court can then facilitate implementation of these standards and procedures. In doing so, there is a sense in
which the court might be said to be deferring to professional judgment, though of a different sort from that assumed in Youngberg. Before the court can defer to this new kind of judgment, however, it will
have to oversee the creation of the processes that make it possible.

208 Id. at 218.
209 See, e.g., Sermak v. Manuel, No. 98-3345, 1999 WL 8oI57i, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1999);
S.H. v. Edwards, 86o F.2d 1045, 1049 (iith Cir. 1988); Ky. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Conn,
718 F.2d 182, i86 (6th Cir. 5983).
210 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY i 1-63 (2001). For an example from one of our contexts, see Schiff &

Shansky, supra note 74, at 21-25, which asserts that "multidisciplinary teams are the real guts" of
an effort to improve prison medical care and gives examples of situations in which medical problems required doctors to collaborate with administrators, guards, dieticians, and maintenance personnel.
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B. Separation of Powers
The trend toward experimentalism in public law cases should mitigate separation-of-powers concerns about structural remedies. Indeed,
it suggests a role for the courts, which might be called accountabilityreinforcing, that fits well with familiar notions of the separation of
powers.
Neither the federal Constitution nor state constitutions specifically
delineate the spheres of the branches of government, and they do not
appear to intend any rigid segregation of activities among them. 2 1
Separation of powers is an implied constraint, and it has to be given
meaning in terms of traditional governmental practice or some principled understanding of democracy.
The objection to structural injunctions from tradition has been precisely the discontinuity between the "traditional model" and public law
litigation that Chayes emphasized.21 2 The objections from democratic
principle point to two roles assigned to the separation of powers in
American constitutional thought. The first is the fragmentation of
powers as a barrier to tyranny; the second is the allocation of responsibility as a mechanism of ensuring accountability to the electorate. 213
Structural injunctions are accused of subverting these principles by excessively concentrating power in the court at the expense of the elec2 14
toral branches.
In fact, we have noted that there is substantial traditional precedent for public law litigation. Chayes exaggerated the discontinuity
between traditional private law adjudication and actions for structural
relief. 215 Moreover, there is clear precedent for structural cases in the
211 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45-46, at 308-23 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
i96i).

212 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (Scalia, J.) ("It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.").
213 Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 1o5 YALE L.J. 1725, 1740-42 (1996).
214 See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 385 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Broad remedial decrees strip state
administrators of their authority to set long-term goals for the institutions they manage and of the
flexibility necessary to make reasonable judgments on short notice under difficult circumstances ....
[They] override the 'State's discretionary authority over its own program and budgets
and forc[e] state officials to reallocate state resources and funds to the [district court's] plan at the
expense of. .. other government programs .... ' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (0995)(Thomas, J., concurring))).
When a federal court adjudicates a claim against a state executive defendant, separation-ofpowers concerns are mediated by federalism. Notwithstanding occasional suggestions to the contrary, however, the federal courts tend to view separation-of-powers issues in public law cases
against state institutions as analogous to those that arise in cases against federal executive defendants. See Robert F. Nagel, supra note 3, at 665-67.
215 See supra section III.B.
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traditional public law practice of enjoining administrative officials to
perform mandatory legal duties - a core feature of the "rule of law"
in the Anglo-American tradition. 1 6 To be sure, such injunctions were
narrower and less frequent in the past, but so was the executive activity they were designed to check. Some expansion of remedies seems
necessary to give meaning to the rule-of-law principle in an era of
vastly changed and expanded government activities. Moreover, it is
uncontroversial that there are important constitutional limits on a legislature's authority to constrain (or even to fail to provide for) the enforcement of substantive rights - even the rights the legislature itself
has created 2 7
To portray the judicial activity in structural reform as encroaching
on executive and legislative discretion ignores the complexity of the relations among the branches in many of these cases. Sometimes, as in
housing and mental health cases, the legislature has authorized structural relief. Only in the prison area do we find a prominent, categorical expression of legislative hostility - the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996 - and even here the statute could have been interpreted
plausibly to impose more modest limits than those the courts have
2 18
inferred.
Moreover, the remedial regimes that emerge from public law cases
sometimes involve elaborate and creative legislation. Legislatures in
Texas and Kentucky enacted innovative educational reforms in response to the school "adequacy" cases there, and legislatures in New
Jersey and Oregon developed statewide programs to supervise local
decisions affecting affordable housing. After courts in Maryland and
New Jersey vindicated complaints about racial profiling, many state
and local governments enacted legislation mandating monitoring regimes in the same spirit as the early judicial remedies. In all these instances, the legislatures would probably not have acted as they did
without the courts' provocation, but the schemes that emerged were
21 9
substantially their own creations.

216 See EDITH HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1963).

On judicial control of

administrative action as a core rule-of-law principle, see A.. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 388-9o (ioth ed. 1959).
217 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2oo0); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 26o-62 (1970).
218 See supra p. 1042. Even after the restrictions of the PLRA, see supra pp. 1041-42, the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-I997J (2000), continues to
authorize Department of Justice suits for structural relief against state prisons.
219 See, e.g., supra pp. 1026-27 & statute cited n.35; p. 1046; pp. o5 1-52 & 1052 n.ii6.
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Turning to the executive branch, we have seen that internal dissensus is a pervasive theme.22 0 More often than not, agency heads or operations officers welcome the suit or at least concede many of the
plaintiffs' allegations. Perhaps under separation-of-powers principles,
it is the position of the jurisdiction's chief magistrate - the governor,
in the case of a state defendant - not that of junior officers, that matters the most. However, even conceding this point, it is remarkable
how rarely the practices that the plaintiffs attack seem to have been
the result of an exercise of authority by anyone. The situation is more
often the consequence of a failure or refusal to make policy. The most
characteristic component of current structural decrees is a demand
that the defendant simply promulgate some policy, often with minimal
or uncontroversial constraints as to what it shall be.
Consider in this regard the background of a recent state institutional case.2 2 Plaintiffs' counsel determined that the practices of a
state agency in one of the areas we surveyed in Part II were woefully
out of compliance with the applicable legal duties. They approached
the senior officers of the agency with their allegations. The officers
largely conceded the violations and expressed a willingness to negotiate a resolution that could be embodied in a statute or a consent decree. The parties tentatively agreed on the broad outlines of a resolution. When the officers approached the governor's office, however,
they were told that the governor was unwilling to take the political
heat for approving measures that would require additional expenditures for the benefit of a politically unpopular group. Efforts to persuade the governor that refusal to settle would involve the state in expensive litigation that it would eventually lose failed to weaken his
resolve. When the institution's officials included a substantial item in
their budget for defense of the litigation, however, one of the leaders of
the legislature noticed it and balked. The legislator then successfully
pressured the governor to agree to a settlement. The plaintiffs, the legislature, and the governor preferred that the settlement be embodied in
a judicial decree rather than in a statute, so the plaintiffs filed the case
with the state's assurance that it would settle promptly, which it did.
The story is more elaborate than most, but the basic theme of
avoidance rather than exercise of responsibility by legislative and

220 Since state executive power is formally more fragmented than federal executive power, division among state officials often makes it difficult to discern what judicial deference to the executive branch would mean. For example, in the Santa Clara, California, jails case, the sheriff - an
elected official who was named as a defendant along with the Board of Supervisors - crossed the
courtroom to sit at the plaintiff's counsel table. The sheriff and the Board were feuding. The
sheriff attributed the jails' problems to inadequate funding; the Board, to the sheriff's mismanagement. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6, at ii6.
221 As recounted to us in confidence by two of the participants.
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elected executive officials is common. The most plausible separationof-powers objection to the role of the court in this case is not that it
usurped executive responsibilities, but that it allowed the use of its office to give political cover to a governor who should have taken responsibility for the decision on his own. Yet without the possibility of
judicial challenge, a situation that no one could defend in good faith
would have persisted. 2
To the extent that old-style command-and-control regimes comprehensively preempted executive authority, both fragmentation and accountability concerns may have been implicated. But because the experimentalist approach leaves the agency more discretion than the
command-and-control approach does, these concerns seem much less
22 3
pressing.
Moreover, the experimentalist approach seems in important respects to vindicate separation-of-powers concerns. This appears particularly clear with respect to accountability. Experimentalist intervention directly serves electoral accountability by requiring executive
officials to make explicit policies and to subject themselves to mechanisms of measurement and monitoring that make their performance
more readily assessable. This scheme potentially makes the executive
more accountable to the legislature and to the electorate, as well as to
224
the court.
These transparency mechanisms should also enhance the accountability of plaintiffs' counsel, other stakeholder representatives, and the
court itself. The new regime makes clear the goals to which the repre222 Sandier and Schoenbrod make the "political cover" version of the diminished accountability
claim. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 8, at 117-38, 153-61. Their concern is important, but their proposals to restrict judicial intervention cannot enhance accountability when
the executive is disposed to passivity and feels no pressure to act.
No doubt there are examples of underperforming agencies that have independently initiated
promising reform projects in ways that have opened themselves up to stakeholders. Sandler and
Schoenbrod's account of the reorganization of New York's Administration for Children's Services
suggests that it may be an example. But in the case brought against that agency, the court proved
able to recognize the quality of the agency's efforts and responded appropriately, declining to enter the type of intrusive orders to which Sandler and Schoenbrod object. See id. at 193-97; see
also Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that even if
the plaintiffs established liability at trial, "the Court may not have been in a position to provide
for more relief than simply encouraging continued effort and improvement by [the defendant]").
Our conception of destabilization rights anticipates such situations by requiring as conditions of
ambitious structural relief both performance failure and political entrenchment.
223 See Nagel, supra note 3, at 708-1o (discussing how "detail in decree" intensifies separationof-powers concerns).
224 To be sure, the legislature could prescribe regimes of monitoring, participation, and accountability on its own. When the court mandates such regimes, it is thus asserting power in relation to the legislature. But the separation of powers permits and even requires judicial mandates
that constrain legislative practice when the constraints are of the sort that induce the legislature to
perform its own function properly. Think of reapportionment, void for vagueness, or the delegation doctrine.
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sentatives have committed their constituents and makes progress
measurable in terms of criteria to which the representatives have
agreed. Where progress is not being made, constituents will sometimes
be in a position to put pressure on or to replace their representatives.
Similarly, lack of progress will reflect on the court. Although the direct mechanisms of judicial accountability are limited, judges are likely
to be reluctant to continue spending the exceptional effort and suffering the public criticism these cases often provoke when they do not
feel that tangible progress is being made.
Experimentalist intervention serves both fragmentation and accountability in another, less traditional way. It opens up the underperforming institution to the influence of and participation by dissatisfied
citizens through stakeholder negotiation. The stakeholder process is
by definition a fragmentation of power and, when it works, it enhances accountability to those with the greatest interest in the institutions. As a form of direct rather than representative democracy and as
an informal process without fixed criteria of standing or operation, the
stakeholder process departs from the traditional premises of American
constitutionalism. But it is potentially a valuable elaboration, one that
serves the broader values of fragmentation and accountability in circumstances in which, by themselves, traditional political processes
would be unable to do so effectively.
Public law litigation rejects the notion that accountability can be
assumed from the fact that an agency is nested in a larger administrative structure formally headed by an elected official. Such an assumption would turn separation-of-powers doctrine into empty formalism.
The electorate as a whole has limited information about and interest in
the operations of particular public institutions, and issues about these
institutions are bundled with myriad other ones when they are presented at the polls. The senior officers of all three branches have limited information and interests and a vast range of responsibilities as
well. The stakeholder process permits a more informal and ad hoc
kind of power-sharing and accountability to those who are most
25
strongly concerned.

225 Thus, the experimentalist style of public law remedy partakes of the same spirit as a variety
of recent reforms that draw on direct citizen participation in areas including policing, environmental protection, and local economic development. See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE
NEW

LIBERALISM:

THE

RISING

POWER

OF

CITIZEN

GROUPS

(igg);

DEEPENING

DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERN-

ANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT. LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY
(2001).
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C. The Problem of Attribution
The next doctrinal issue might be called the problem of attribution.
The plaintiff seeks structural relief against the government or senior
officials. Sometimes, as with de jure segregation, she will be able to
prove systematic misconduct by the senior officials. Often, however,
her proof consists of a series of discrete episodes of misconduct by
lower-level agents. The question then arises of when these episodes
will be deemed to demonstrate systemic misconduct, or to put it differently, when they will be attributed to the government or senior officials
against whom relief is sought.
The issue is theoretically present in all of the contexts surveyed
above, but it arises most prominently in police abuse cases. Federal
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against local government or senior state
officials on the basis of misconduct by subordinates requires a showing
that misconduct was a matter of explicit "policy" or a tacitly condoned
"pattern or practice. 2 2 6 In addition, both the traditional "irreparable
injury" requirement for equitable relief and standing requirements depend on a showing that the conduct is likely to be repeated on a sig22 7
nificant scale in the absence of structural relief.

Since the misconduct in question is rarely explicitly authorized,
plaintiffs try to show an ongoing "pattern or practice." Typically, proof
takes the form of evidence of a number of episodes of misconduct, and
of knowledge and unresponsiveness on the part of the superiors. At
some level, evidence of repeated discrete instances compels an inference of condonation.
Acts of subordinate misconduct do not establish supervisor liability
by themselves, however, except insofar as they permit an inference
about state of mind. The core case is intentional participation or
encouragement. More recent cases, however, rarely fit this scenario.
The courts have not narrowed the liability of senior officials to cases in
which they have been active wrongdoers. Yet neither have the courts
been comfortable with the idea that officials' failure to stop the conduct is enough. They require a showing of a state of mind between intention and indifference. Thus, we get standards such as "deliberate
'
indifference. 228
The elaborate body of doctrine that wrestles with these issues has
two salient deficiencies. First, it treats what are basically institutional
226 E.g., Porter v. Nussle, 523 U.S. 516, 530 (2002). Sovereign immunity principles survive suf-

ficiently to preclude general respondeat superior liability for officials performing public functions
of the sort considered here. The principal rationale is that public tasks require significant discretion, and officers are entitled to substantial deference by virtue of their position in the executive
branch. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 676-83 (1978).
227 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 0976).

228 E.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
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issues in psychological terms and, indeed, incoherent psychological
terms. "Deliberate indifference" is an oxymoron. It misapprehends the
most pertinent psychological and institutional realities. In the typical
case these days, the senior officials neither desire nor actively promote
the misconduct. If they could have eliminated it costlessly, they would
have done so. Their problem is that eliminating the conduct would
involve substantial costs of many kinds - economic, political, emotional and for reasons that may be both selfish and publicregarding, they have made tradeoffs that permit the misconduct to
continue. The important question is whether these tradeoffs are acceptable, or whether they give certain values less weight than the applicable law requires. Preoccupation with states of mind simply diverts energy and attention from the pertinent considerations.
Second, the focus on the officials' mental states risks creating
strong disincentives for the kind of internal monitoring that is critical
to addressing many of the problems involved in these lawsuits. If liability depends on intent, then officials might reasonably conclude that
ignorance is the best defense. 22 9 We do not usually think of people as
intending consequences of which they are unaware. Of course, courts
will at some point assume that officials "must have known" about conduct that was widespread and salient, and they will sometimes conclude that deliberate avoidance of knowledge is tantamount to knowledge. However, courts do not reach such conclusions easily; they often
require a fairly elaborate showing by the plaintiffs. The official who
concedes knowledge of ongoing misconduct will often be in a worse
position than the one who can plausibly deny it. Officials are rarely in
a better position for having sought out knowledge.
The experimentalist perspective suggests two improvements on the
current standards of institutional liability. First, it directs assessment
of the defendant institution's performance failures away from the motivations of the individuals who occupy its senior offices. It suggests
that these failures are more likely to be the product of a series of political compromises in which the values to which the plaintiffs appeal
have been slighted or, relatedly, the result of a kind of low-level political equilibrium in which everyone fares less well than he might, but in
which no single actor has both the incentive and the power to make
changes without prodding.

229 At the trial of a case challenging prison medical conditions, the head of the California Department of Corrections testified that he had resisted developing a procedure to screen inmates for
mental illnesses "because he knew that once mentally ill individuals were identified he would be
responsible for treating them." Craig Haney & Donald Specter, Treatment Rights in Uncertain
Times, in TREATING ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 51, 70 (Jos6
B. Ashford et al. eds., 2ooi).
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Second, it argues for a reversal of the penalty for monitoring implicit in the mental-state approach. If the most promising remedial
approach to public rights enforcement failure involves monitoring,
participation, and disciplined comparisons, then defendants who have
initiated these practices should get credit for doing so. Good-faith initiation should weigh against the finding of political entrenchment that,
on our view, is a prerequisite for liability. These practices tend both to
create compliance pressures on lower-tier workers and to open the larger system up to political pressures toward compliance. They thus
give credibility to the defense that nonjudicial political processes are
sufficient to induce reform. Conversely, the failure of defendant institutions to adopt state-of-the-art compliance procedures ought to count
against them in liability determinations.
The experimentalist approach in public law parallels recent trends
in private organizational liability. In the corporate area, for example,
the same tendency to reject executive liability for failure to supervise
compliance with legal duties and to treat ignorance of even routine
subordinate misconduct as exculpatory was long prominent. This tendency has changed significantly in recent decades. As a matter of
practice, it has become the norm for corporations to have compliance
programs in a variety of sensitive areas, such as environmental and securities law. The igi
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for corporate defendants broke ground by making good-faith compliance monitoring
efforts an important mitigating factor in sentencing in federal criminal
prosecutions of corporations. 230 The courts have begun to suggest that
the duty of care of corporate executives includes an affirmative obligation to monitor.23' A shift in focus in public law litigation away from
a focus on mental states and toward institutional efficacy would be in
line with such private law developments.
D. The Problem of Interest Representation
Chayes's article concluded with a discussion of the "problem of interest representation. ' 23 2 Public law litigation requires representation
of affected people. Most participation must be through representatives. So the court must identify the affected people, assess the representativeness of those who purport to speak for them, and sometimes
assign weights to the competing interests asserted in the process.
230 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 ('994).
231 Chancellor Allen discussed these developments in In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996). Another analogous private context is
sexual harassment employment discrimination, in which such notions as "hostile work environment" have shifted the inquiry from the motivations of individual managers to institutional structures and have led to an implied duty to monitor. See Sturm, supra note io,at 480-9o.
232 Chayes, supra note i,at 1310-14.

io98

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11I7:1oi 5

Chayes argued that courts are not ill-equipped to identify affected
interests and routinely do so under federal joinder and class action
rules. He approved of the tendency of joinder doctrine and remedial
practice toward inclusiveness. He noted various techniques for inducing the representation of groups that did not appear on their own initiative. These techniques included broad notice of the suit and its
processes, refusal to proceed until the original parties procure the representation of specified interests, recruitment efforts by special masters, and invitations to amici curiae. With respect to the problem of
weighing of interests, Chayes said without elaboration, "[a] part of the
answer may be found in the suggestion that the decision, or at least the
2' 33
remedy, involves a species of negotiation among the parties.
Our perspective suggests some elaborations on this response. To
begin, the experimentalist tendency treats participation not just as an
aspect of the initial remedial formulation, but as a core feature of the
remedy itself. The substantive remedial terms are provisional. They
are expected to be renegotiated in the light of experience. Thus, a
critical element of the decree is the establishment of participatory
processes for such renegotiation. The task of identifying affected interests and inducing their participation does not need to be fully accomplished at the outset. New constituencies will appear in the course
of implementation, and because the rules are revisable, these constituencies will have an opportunity to challenge them.
Further, Chayes's suggestion that the difficulty of weighing interests can be remedied in part through "a species of negotiation among
the parties" is more powerful in the experimentalist perspective.
Chayes's discussion of negotiation was ambiguous. On one reading, he
conceived of it as a kind of pluralist bargaining in which groups compromise their particularistic interests in a resolution that reflects their
relative power. Under this reading, the problem of weighing interests
raises a dilemma. Either the negotiated resolution would simply reflect the preexisting balance of power among the affected groups, in
which case it would be tainted by the inequities that the lawsuit was
brought to redress. Or alternatively, it would reflect a reallocation of
power through the court's declaration of entitlements in its liability
determination. In this case, however, the court would have to be able
to specify the parties' entitlements, and that would require something
like the specific weighing of interests that Chayes conceded would be
difficult.
On another reading, Chayes discusses the remedial negotiation in
terms of the deliberative consensus of democratic experimentalism. In
contrast to bargaining, deliberation is centrally committed to reason233 Id.

at 1312.
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giving and openness to persuasion. It insists that the parties remain
open to the possibility that they may not fully understand their selfinterest and that they be at least hopeful of finding solutions that
vindicate common values. It aspires to be a process of learning and
solidarity-building rather than simply dispute settlement.
Destabilization rights and experimentalist remediation complement
the consensus approach, but they are not helpful and may even be
harmful to pluralist bargaining. Pluralist bargaining proceeds through
implicit threats by the parties about the costs each can impose on the
other by failing to agree. The more the parties agree on what these
costs are, the more likely they will find it in their self-interest to come
to some agreement. The more divergence in the parties' estimations
about the costs of failing to agree, the more likely pluralist bargaining
will fail.134 Moreover, each party in the pluralist process assesses the
benefits of settlement primarily in terms of her selfish interests, and
the opposing party calculates her strategy in terms of the behavior she
anticipates given her understanding of her adversary's self-interest. To
the extent that the parties are uncertain about their own interests, both
the parties' decisions about what outcomes to accept and their predictions about what their adversaries will accept become more difficult.
This makes pluralist negotiation more strenuous.
Destabilization
rights are designed to increase uncertainty about both the parties' interests and the costs of refusing to agree. Thus, they may amplify the
impediments already inherent in pluralist bargaining. On the other
hand, this uncertainty potentially enhances deliberative bargaining in
the ways discussed above. It can open the parties to the broader cognitive and moral orientations that produce creative solutions.
If we follow the destabilization perspective in understanding remedial negotiation as deliberative, we can give some substance to
Chayes's suggestion that such negotiation responds to the problem of
weighing interests. From the pluralist perspective, weighing private
interests is important because the solution is viewed as an effort to
maximize the satisfaction of diverse interests. By contrast, deliberation is an attempt to approximate a common interest. Even to the extent they know their current interests and powers, deliberative practitioners assume that these understandings may change in the course of
deliberation; they cannot assume that there is any strong relation between the power position of a particular participant and her capacity
to contribute to the discovery of generally valuable solutions.

234 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 975-80 (1979) (arguing, on pluralist assumptions, that divergence in expectations about the litigated outcome tends to reduce the likelihood of settlement).
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This claim, however, should not be exaggerated. Under the best
circumstances, deliberators will have definite commitments to particularistic interests and will be influenced by some sense of their fallback
positions in the event of nonagreement. Those with the better fallback
positions will have more power in the negotiation. Parties will benefit
from greater capacities and resources in the negotiation process itself
and from cultural and psychological advantages. In this sense, the dynamics of unequal bargaining power affect deliberative as well as pluralist negotiations. Moreover, even a negotiation that produces an ostensibly consensual result may appear to an outside observer or to one
or more of the participants to be coerced. The intuition behind destabilization rights suggests only that there are resources of goodwill and
creativity that can be tapped by a combination of uncertainty and opportunity. "Interests" in the pluralist sense will continue to play a role,
but the role will be a more provisional one. But to the extent that the
destabilization effects induce deliberative negotiation, the burden on
the court to define and weigh interests should be less than under pluralist bargaining.
V. CONCLUSION

Recent discussion has tended to underrate the potential of public
law litigation because it has tended to misperceive its forms. Much
criticism has been directed at a model of judge-centered, hierarchical,
and rule-bound intervention that has ceased to correspond to trial
court practice. In fact, trial judges and litigants have crafted more decentralized and indirect forms of intervention that rely on stakeholder
negotiation, rolling-rule regimes, and transparency. No definite assessment of the efficacy of this "experimentalist" approach is possible
yet, but the approach seems to avoid the defects emphasized by the
critics in the older one, and early returns on some efforts give reason
for optimism.
The experimentalist approach is also responsive to concerns about
the legitimacy of judicial intervention in public law cases. Experimentalist intervention is both more consistent with judicial practice in
common law cases and more compatible with electoral mechanisms of
democratic accountability than most accounts of public law litigation
recognize. Experimentalist remedies expose public institutions to pressures of disciplined comparison that resemble the market pressures enforced by common law norms. At the same time, the transparency
they induce facilitates related forms of democratic intervention, including electoral ones.
The features of experimentalist intervention that respond to concerns about both efficacy and legitimacy are captured by the idea of
destabilization rights. In stigmatizing the status quo, the court's intervention opens the defendant institution up to participation of previ-
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ously marginalized stakeholders and clears the way for the redefinition
of relations among more established ones. Counterintuitively, destabilization through new public law creates opportunities for collaborative
learning and democratic accountability that the more certain world
of pluralist bargaining under the aegis of courts or legislatures often
precludes.

